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62.
Unilateral action to withdraw (the first course) might be the only course open to us in circumstances in which we felt obliged to withdraw (paragraph 49 above). But as a course of action likely to be actively opposed by China it should not be adopted unless Chinese intransigence or internal conditions compel us to do so. We can be sure that the Chinese will not stand by
However, in and permit us to withdraw without some interference. circumstances where the climate for a negotiated handover appears favourable but the Chinese do not respond to our overtures, it is conceivable that a declaration of intention to withdraw coupled with an expressed readiness to talk about it might bring the Chinese to the Conference table. Much would depend on whether our departure suited China's interest at that time. 63.
There remains the second course the possibility of negotiating our withdrawal, the prospects of which are discussed below. Like the decision to withdraw unilaterally, once we were committed to negotiations we would have to go through with them. There could be no drawing back if the terms were unacceptable; cur internal position in Hong Kong could not survive abortive negotiations, even if the Chinese were prepared to accept the situation. We might have to offer, during the negotiations or as part of the negotiated settlement, to associate the Chinese with the administration of the Colony as a means of maintaining the internal security situation, but as a course to be pursued deliberately, even in a situation where the Chinese are showing a spirit of reasonable co-operation, it would carry some great dangers. From a position within the administration, the Chinese would have an infinite capacity to interfere. At any time they would be able to instigate trouble among their supporters and If then to hamper or frustrate cur efforts to deal with it. they were not already represented in the security forces as part of the arrangement, they would possess a cast-iron pretext for bringing police or troops in to deal with a difficult or deteriorating situation. They could use their position to limit our withdrawal of persons and assets, to the extent that they considered it necessary to retain "hostages" in order to squeeze the maximum advantage out of us (both before and after our departure). They could manoeuvre us into a position in which we might be forced to postpone our departure indefinitely for the
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