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sake of our hostages. This course might however prove to be the only way in which we could effect an orderly withdrawal in the face of uncompromising Chinese hostility and opposition. But it would seem prudent to follow it only if circumstances during the negotiations compel it; to offer it earlier would undoubtedly
put irresistible temptations in their way.
Prospects for a Negotiated Solution
64. The prospects that China would respond with any reasonable degree of co-operation to such a move on our part must depend very
much on
:
(a) Whether it suited their policy at that time to take the
Colony over and, if it did, what their "interest" was in getting it back. If we chose a time that did not suit either their economic or political objectives, we could expect them to maximise their demands upon us and to seek to ensure that we left in utter confusion and in the most humiliating conditions. If our withdrawal did suit their policy, their reaction might vary from an uncompromising statement of their terms if they wanted to extract a propaganda and prestige advantage to a reasonable negotiating posture if they were genuinely anxious, for economic reasons, to take Hong Kong over
with minimum damage to its economy.
(b) The credibility of our negotiating position.
In this
respect we would be in the best position if we sought to withdraw voluntarily when conditions were more or less normal, in a less satisfactory position if we tried when conditions in Hong Kong were difficult (e.g. because of economic decline) and in the worst possible position if we did so under Chinese pressure.
65. The weakness of our negotiating position is that we would have many hostages in Hong Kong in terms of people and assets, a substantial proportion of which we should find it very difficult (if not impossible) to move. We ourselves have no means of bringing substantial pressure to bear on China. Our trade with here is not significant; our exports are neither vital nor irreplaceable from other sources. Our military capability (including nuclear capability) could hardly be a factor in a
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