TOP SECRET
61.
(ii) to approach the Chinese with a view to negotiating our withdrawal. This might include (but not initially) an offer to consider an interim period of dual Anglo-Chinese control of the Colony; (iii) to accept indirect Chinese influence over the way
in which we administer Hong Kong (i.e. a Macao- type situation) with a view to ultimate trans-
ference of control.
60. Given the character and attitude of the present regime in China, the only course to which we could expect the Chinese to respond in the foreseeable future would be our acceptance of a Macao-type situation (the third course). Any attempt at present to abdicate our position by unilateral action (the first course) would meet with a sharp and hostile Chinese reaction and we would be subject to the maximum harrassment in our attempt to extricate ourselves. We certainly could not hope today to engage the Chinese in genuine and reasonable negotiations (the second course).
In our view the acceptance of a Macao-type situation will not
On the at any time provide an acceptable means of withdrawal. face of it, it could have the merit of frustrating the worst Chinese intentions; and, by a process of gradual assimilation to Chinese control, it might help to avoid the disruptive, possibly violent, consequences of a sudden transfer of authority. But, as has been noted in paragraph 14 of our Interim Report, it would put us entirely in the hands of the Chinese, both as to the manner and timing of our final departure; our bargaining position would be compromised when it camo to seeking an eventual settlement; our people there would be hostages who would be used to extract the maximum concessions. We would be faced by serious economic and political repercussions in Hong Kong in a situation of dwindling confidence. Additionally our lack of effective authority could raise acute political difficulties in relation to Ministers' responsibilities to Parliament for the administration of the territory. We might find that our control was so circumscribed as to prevent our making any attempt to discharge our responsibilities to even the vulnerable category of Chinese in Hong Kong.
/ 62.
TOP SECRET
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.