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to the Cultural Revolution, we should then very seriously look for a
suitable opportunity of extricating ourselves from Hong Kong by a
negotiated settlement with Peking.
13. It seemed to us that the appreciation and views of the Governor
and the C.B.F. were in the circumstances realistic. It is a stark
thought indeed that, for the present at any rate, we are trapped in
Hong Kong, with very little chance of being able to negotiate an orderly withdrawal, and with all that this implies if the Communists
should decide on all-out confrontation. But this does appear to us
to be the situation with which we are faced.
14. But while fully accepting the view of Sir David Trench and
General Worsley that contingency planning for a possible British
withdrawal from Hong Kong, should circumstances permit, should not be
undertaken locally because of the grave dangers to which we should
be exposed if this should ever become known, we felt that we ought to try to give some more thought in London to the problems we could
expect to have to face. The decision taken by D.O.P.C. at their meeting on May 25th that officials should consider our policy in respect of Hong Kong affords the opportunity for conducting this study. But we shall have to be extremely careful to consult nobody in Hong Kong save the Governor and the C. B. E. personally.
15.
We realise that a British decision to try to withdraw from Hong Kong would involve several important foreign and Commonwealth interests. We did not attempt to discuss these with the Governor and the C. B. F., since in our talks in Hong Kong we were primarily
concerned with the basic question whether we would be likely to be
able to extricate ourselves in circumstances other than those of a
capitulation, should we decide to do so. The committee of officials referred to in paragraph 14 of thisminute will obviously have to identify these foreign and Commonwealth interests.
16. This minute has been drafted in consultation with Mr. Bolland and Mr. Carter. If you agree, we might circulate copies to the Official Committee, as at least a starting point for their examination
of this complex of problems?
ANG.
(A.N. Galsworthy)
31st May, 1967
Copies to -
Mr. Hall
Mr. Walsh-Atkins
Mr. Bolland (Foreign Office)
Mr.
Carter
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