TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 84

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the way proposed, we would be underlining unduly the link between

British subjects in China and our policies in Hong Kong, and that

this might encourage the Chinese to try to bargain further and larger

relemmer of detainees against the release of British subjects in

detention in China. However, the significance of Hong Kong is now so

clear that there seemslittle advantage in trying to play it down.

Moreover, we are sure that the Chinese would not consider the release

of detainees as an appropriate quid pro que for the release of Mr.

Grey, and we doubt very much whether it would directly influence their

attitude towerde other British subjects either. I very much doubt

whether they would, for example, consider releasing Kr. Watt of

Vickers-Zimmer or the two Merchant Marine officers in exchange for

detainees. (The Merchant Marine officers may well be released in any

case if they make suitable confessions.) The chances of securing the

release of detained British subjects as a whole ere however likely to

improve if relations in general improve, and for this reason alone,

the release of detainees is to be encouraged. If the Governor argues

that he has not got ten "less important" persons according to the

criterion referred to above, we will have to be content with the

release of as many as he can offer. If he considers that the relenno

of ten or more at once would of itself be too dramatic a gesture

which might be exploited unduly by the local Communists, he might be

asked to release smaller groups over the next few weeks. However,

the impact would be far greater if a larger number were released

and I think that he should be pressed in this direction.

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