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the way proposed, we would be underlining unduly the link between
British subjects in China and our policies in Hong Kong, and that
this might encourage the Chinese to try to bargain further and larger
relemmer of detainees against the release of British subjects in
detention in China. However, the significance of Hong Kong is now so
clear that there seemslittle advantage in trying to play it down.
Moreover, we are sure that the Chinese would not consider the release
of detainees as an appropriate quid pro que for the release of Mr.
Grey, and we doubt very much whether it would directly influence their
attitude towerde other British subjects either. I very much doubt
whether they would, for example, consider releasing Kr. Watt of
Vickers-Zimmer or the two Merchant Marine officers in exchange for
detainees. (The Merchant Marine officers may well be released in any
case if they make suitable confessions.) The chances of securing the
release of detained British subjects as a whole ere however likely to
improve if relations in general improve, and for this reason alone,
the release of detainees is to be encouraged. If the Governor argues
that he has not got ten "less important" persons according to the
criterion referred to above, we will have to be content with the
release of as many as he can offer. If he considers that the relenno
of ten or more at once would of itself be too dramatic a gesture
which might be exploited unduly by the local Communists, he might be
asked to release smaller groups over the next few weeks. However,
the impact would be far greater if a larger number were released
and I think that he should be pressed in this direction.
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