TNAG-0022-FCO40-58-Facilities-for-US-Forces-1968 — Page 153

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HONK KONG TELEGRAM NO. 739 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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5. FOR HONG KONG, HOWEVER, THIS IS VERY FAR FROM BEING A SECONDAFY

ISSUE. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT A SIGNIFICANT DETELFENT TO ANY

FASH CHINESE ACTION HERE HAS BEEN THE FEAR OF SOME AMERICAN FESPONSE.

IT SEEMS VERY IMPOPTANT FROM OUT POINT OF VIEW TO KEEP THE CHINESE

GUESSING ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY AND THE OCCASIONAL PRESENCE OF

POWERFUL AMERICAN WARSHIPS IS A SIMPLE MEANS OF DOING SO. IF WE

WERE HENCEFORTH TO CUT OUT ALL VISITS BY HEAVY VESSELS WE WOULD

BE MAKING A MAJOR CONCESSION FOR WHICH WE COULD EXPECT NO RETURN:

AND THE COMMUNISTS COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PRESS FOR FURTHER LIKIT-

ATION OF NAVAL VISITS. WE OUGHT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE POSSIELE

EFFECTS ECTH ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ON THE AMERICAN

ATTITUDE TO HONG KONG. AMERICA IS HONG KONG'S LARGEST MARKET AND

WE HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST IN MAINTAINING OUR GOOD RELATIONS. A

ELATANT CLIME-DOWN AT AMERICAN EXPENSE IN THE FACE OF COMMUNIST

THREATS WOULD BE HARDLY LIKELY TO HELP.

6. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE INSIDE HONG KONG.

MANY OF THE POPULATION DERIVED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE PRESENCE OF

MAJOK U.S. SHIPS HERE LAST YEAR DURING THE DISTURBANCES. IF WE WEFE

NOW TO STOP THEM COMING IN RESPONSE TO WHAT HAS BEEN CHLY A

DESULTORY CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE BY THE COMMUNISTS, THE EFFFC1 ON LOCAL

MORALE COULD BE SEFICUS.

7. THEFE IS REALLY A BASIC ISSUF HELE. NOTHING THAT WE HAVE DONE

IN RELATION TO RECENT NAVAL VISITS DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM OUR

POLICY OF THE PAST THREE OF FOUR YEARS. THELF IS NO REASON TO

SUPPOSE THAT THE CHINESE ARE NOW NOFF AFFAID OF THE THREAT THESE

VISIT POSE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME DUFING THE SAKE PER100

CINDEED THEY MUST KNOW THAT THESE PAJOT VESSELS IN FEALITY POSE LESS

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