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HONK KONG TELEGRAM NO. 739 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
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5. FOR HONG KONG, HOWEVER, THIS IS VERY FAR FROM BEING A SECONDAFY
ISSUE. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT A SIGNIFICANT DETELFENT TO ANY
FASH CHINESE ACTION HERE HAS BEEN THE FEAR OF SOME AMERICAN FESPONSE.
IT SEEMS VERY IMPOPTANT FROM OUT POINT OF VIEW TO KEEP THE CHINESE
GUESSING ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY AND THE OCCASIONAL PRESENCE OF
POWERFUL AMERICAN WARSHIPS IS A SIMPLE MEANS OF DOING SO. IF WE
WERE HENCEFORTH TO CUT OUT ALL VISITS BY HEAVY VESSELS WE WOULD
BE MAKING A MAJOR CONCESSION FOR WHICH WE COULD EXPECT NO RETURN:
AND THE COMMUNISTS COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PRESS FOR FURTHER LIKIT-
ATION OF NAVAL VISITS. WE OUGHT ALSO TO CONSIDER THE POSSIELE
EFFECTS ECTH ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND ON THE AMERICAN
ATTITUDE TO HONG KONG. AMERICA IS HONG KONG'S LARGEST MARKET AND
WE HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST IN MAINTAINING OUR GOOD RELATIONS. A
ELATANT CLIME-DOWN AT AMERICAN EXPENSE IN THE FACE OF COMMUNIST
THREATS WOULD BE HARDLY LIKELY TO HELP.
6. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE INSIDE HONG KONG.
MANY OF THE POPULATION DERIVED ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE PRESENCE OF
MAJOK U.S. SHIPS HERE LAST YEAR DURING THE DISTURBANCES. IF WE WEFE
NOW TO STOP THEM COMING IN RESPONSE TO WHAT HAS BEEN CHLY A
DESULTORY CAMPAIGN OF PRESSURE BY THE COMMUNISTS, THE EFFFC1 ON LOCAL
MORALE COULD BE SEFICUS.
7. THEFE IS REALLY A BASIC ISSUF HELE. NOTHING THAT WE HAVE DONE
IN RELATION TO RECENT NAVAL VISITS DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM OUR
POLICY OF THE PAST THREE OF FOUR YEARS. THELF IS NO REASON TO
SUPPOSE THAT THE CHINESE ARE NOW NOFF AFFAID OF THE THREAT THESE
VISIT POSE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME DUFING THE SAKE PER100
CINDEED THEY MUST KNOW THAT THESE PAJOT VESSELS IN FEALITY POSE LESS
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