TNAG-0022-FCO40-58-Facilities-for-US-Forces-1968 — Page 152

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3. IT IS PLAIN THAT, APART FROM THE VERY SPECIAL CASE OF

''ENTERPRISE'', NUCLEAR VISITS ALE A SENSITIVE POINT WITH THE 190CHINESE AND I HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED IN MY TELECTAN 709 THAT

WE SHOULD TRY TO NEGOTIATE A NEW GUIDELINE GOVERNING THER. OF THE

OTHER HAND, WE HAVE ALWAYS OPERATED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT

BECAUSE H.M.G. TOO HAVE NUCLEAR SHIPS WHICH NEED TO GO TO FOREIGN

FCETS, WE OUGHT NOT TO DISCRIMINATE MARKEDLY AGAINST FOLE IGN SHIPS THAT AFE NUCLEAR PROPELLED, AND I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD

CUT OUT NUCLEAT VISITS ALTOGETHER.

4.

ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL ISSUES I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT IN HONG

KONG WE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF GENUINE CHINESE SUSCEPTIBILITIES.

BUT I WONDER WHETHER ON THIS ISSUE THE SUSCEPTIBILITIES

ARE GENUINE. THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF EVIDENCE AT THE TIME OF

THE ENTERPRISE'S FIFS1 VISIT CIN 1966) THAT THE CHINESE WERE

GENUINELY AFRAID OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN ATTACK. THERE SEEN

TO BE LITTLE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS IS STILL TUE: INDEED A CANTON

RED GUARD NEWSPAPER REPORT D'AT THE END OF MAFCH A SPEECH! 1. WHICH

CHOU EN LAI INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT A U.S. ATTACK WAS NOT AT PRESENT PROBABLE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM NOT CONVINCED

THAT THE FUSS ABOUT ENTERPRISE'S VISIT REFLECTS A GENUINE FEAR BY THE CHINESE. THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY HAVE PRESENTED THE ISSUE SUGGESTS THAT THEY REGARD IT PLIMARILY AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE,

USEFUL (A) IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT TO SHOW THEIT CONCELE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND (B) IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT AS A IFW THEME TO WHICH TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THEIR DISHEARTENED SUPPORTERS, WITH THE DEPARTURE OF ENTERPRISE THE PEOPAGANDA CEASEL.