CO537-6564 — Page 35

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the economic and political concessions she has extorted in

border areas like Manchuria and Sinkiang, her tough commercial

methods, one-sided cultural penetration, and the principles of

behaviour of Russian technicians, advisers, spies and officials

in China (who were a particular source of irritation in Yugo-

slavia). These points may legitimately be made in broadcasts

and similar media aimed primarily or incidentally at areas under

Communist control.

6.

In Japan and Korea our anti-Communist publicity activities

must be ancillary to those of the United States; but there are

a growing number of fields, both overt and discreet, especially

those connected with labour, etc., in which the American

authorities welcome our material and our technical collaboration.

In South-East Asia the task is divided into two parts:

activities directed at the Overseas Chinese communities on the

one hand; and those directed towards the indigenous Asian

peoples on the other. This division is discernible even in

the special case of Malaya. Experience shows that publicity put out through official Western channels (and more especially

through official agencies of the British, French, U.S. and Dutch Governments) tends to produce little effect on Asians: and

such effect as it does produce often tends to be the opposite

of what was intended, since the public throughout South-East Asia

is quick to suspect the motives of Western powers who attack

Communism. It is therefore important in anti-Communist

publicity to work where possible through Asian channels, and to

ensure that the hand of the white man shall remain invisible to

the public

8.

There is some evidence that the previous almost universal

acceptance by the Overseas Chinese press of something like the

Peking Line has now given place to a more cautious and critical

/attitude

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