CO537-6564 — Page 36

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attitude towards Communist China.

Two influences which have

helped to bring this about seem to be the realization by the

Overseas Chinese communities that they are still living in

countries with non-Communist or even anti-Communist Governments,

and the discouraging news through private channels about China

itself which contradicts the rosy propaganda put out by Peking.

The special case of Malaya is treated in an annexe. For the

rest of the Overseas Chinese, efforts should be made to

stimulate this type of adverse criticism, on points connected

with Russian imperialism as well as unsatisfactory local con-

ditions, by all discreet means including Asian press comment

and reports and other similar information which might not other-

wise be available locally to the Chinese communities. It is

also important to avoid disseminating obviously false or

embroidered information or Kuomintang propaganda, which merely

compromises the channels used. The importance of discretion,

if this operation is to succeed, has been agreed in conversations

in London with the Deputy Under Secretary in charge of Publicity

of the State Department. While the United States Government

do not recognise the Peking Government, they are none the less

agreed with us on the objectives outlined in this paper.

There is every advantage in close contact with United States

publicity organisations in the field, and in ensuring that

whatever the channels used, they should build up confidence in

their reliability.

9.

Towards the indigenous populations of South-East Asia the

task is theo retically easier; we must hammer into them the

essential opposition of Soviet imperialism to Asian nationalism

and seek to invoke the latter in the cause of resistance to

Communist encroachment. The Soviet Union has played into our

hands in this task to some extent by declaring its hostility to

/the Governments