CO537-6564 — Page 34

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of the Soviet Communist Party to control China for long;

but a breach if it comes will only be effected to a slight

extent by the actions of foreign powers, even the United States.

No non-Communist power can hope to do much to promote a "Titoist“

development of the Chinese Communist Party that is, a break

from complete domination by the Kremlin, without necessarily the

abandonment of Communist principles in internal economic and

political development. (Tito's own breach with the Kremlin

was not prevented by Western policy towards him before the

breach.)

4. On the other hand we must exploit, so far as is possible

within our very limited means, the points of friction between

the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, the Chinese People's

Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union, and the people

of China and the Russian agents of intelligence, security and

economic and commercial penetration. It is essential to any

policy of such "encouragement" of Titoism that there should be

throughout our propaganda and guidance to the press no

suggestion that such a tendency is, in fact, developing or that

we want it: on the contrary, our propaganda should harp on the

domination of the C.C.P. by the Kremlin and the consequent

subordination of Chinese interests to those of Russia, both

throughout China in general and in the border provinces

especially. His Majesty's Government's policy of recognition

of the Peking Government makes it necessary that all our emphasis

should be on the attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience

of China and advantages at Chinese expense; we should not

criticise the behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and

Government in acquiescing to the Kremlin's behaviour.

Publicity about Russian policy in China can be richly illus-

trated from the precedents of Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe,

5.

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