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of the Soviet Communist Party to control China for long;
but a breach if it comes will only be effected to a slight
extent by the actions of foreign powers, even the United States.
No non-Communist power can hope to do much to promote a "Titoist“
development of the Chinese Communist Party that is, a break
from complete domination by the Kremlin, without necessarily the
abandonment of Communist principles in internal economic and
political development. (Tito's own breach with the Kremlin
was not prevented by Western policy towards him before the
breach.)
4. On the other hand we must exploit, so far as is possible
within our very limited means, the points of friction between
the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, the Chinese People's
Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union, and the people
of China and the Russian agents of intelligence, security and
economic and commercial penetration. It is essential to any
policy of such "encouragement" of Titoism that there should be
throughout our propaganda and guidance to the press no
suggestion that such a tendency is, in fact, developing or that
we want it: on the contrary, our propaganda should harp on the
domination of the C.C.P. by the Kremlin and the consequent
subordination of Chinese interests to those of Russia, both
throughout China in general and in the border provinces
especially. His Majesty's Government's policy of recognition
of the Peking Government makes it necessary that all our emphasis
should be on the attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience
of China and advantages at Chinese expense; we should not
criticise the behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and
Government in acquiescing to the Kremlin's behaviour.
Publicity about Russian policy in China can be richly illus-
trated from the precedents of Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe,
5.
/the