CO537-4999 — Page 86

2 June 1949

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JIC(FE) (49) 21(Final)

frontier, in the hope that rendition can be secured by these means alone. Since the Communists almost certainly appreciate that more drastic measures may eventually be required to achieve this aim, they will prepare for an all-out assault on Hong Kong.

5.

In fomenting internal unrest the Communists will employ their usual well-known methods. The possible incursion of armed Nationalist deserters will throughout aggravate the internal security problem.

6.

Economic pressure would include discrimination against Hong Kong's trade and may even go to the length of a total embargo on trade between Hong Kong and Communist China. Although such action would be disastrous to Hong Kong from the economic point of view, it would make the internal threat much easier to deal with, since it would then be possible to enforce rigorous immigration controls which cannot be done now without seriously prejudicing the entrepot trade. So long as Hong Kong were unable to trade it would cease to be an economic asset and become a military liability.

7.

We estimate that incursions across the New Territories! border by armed guerilla bands (unlikely to consist of more than 150 men each) will coincide with the peak period of internal unrest but may take place at any time during the period that pressure is being applied to the Colony. Such raids, in which up to three bands might act in conjunction, would be carried out on orders of the Communist High Command, though they will take care to discwn responsibility. We consider it unlikely that substantially larger numbers would be committed until such time as the High Command has decided to carry out a full scale assault.

8.

We estimate that the Communist regular forces will not be able to launch a powerful assault on Hong Kong until late September. Such an assault would probably be delivered by one or two Communist Armies, each organised into three divisions of approximately 10,000 men. They could be supported by up to 400 guns and 100 light tanks, though their air support would be on a very limited scale. or three similar Armies, but without the same scale of artillery and

Two armoured support, would probably be held in reserve.

9.

There may also be a short-lived air threat, the scale of which will depend on the fate of the Nationalist Air Force. In the unlikely event of the latter being absorbed bodily into the Communist forces, the scale of an initial attack might be fifty bombers, but would probably be less than twenty. Subsequent attacks, if attempted at all, would be on a much reduced scale. Kai Tak airfield will be a first priority target.

10.

In the face of the Far East Fleet there will be no threat

· of surface attack from Communist Naval forces. Nevertheless, seaborne raids in small craft, sabotage of ships and installations and some amateur sea-mining may be expected.

11.

The threats to Hong Kong by means short of a full-scale attack may well continue for many months. We consider that the Communists would have no difficulty in maintaining a serious military threat over a long period. They are not at present short of supplies and as time goes on they should be able to improve their maintenance organisation.

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