CO537-4999 — Page 85

2 June 1949

منيه

134 94007/28.

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JIC (FE)(49)21(Final)

BRITISH DEFENCE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE, FAR EAST

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, FAR EAST

THE THREATS TO HONG KONG

In anticipation of instructions we have estimated the threats to Hong Kong presented by the southward advance of the Chinese Communist forces.

2.

In preparing this report which is annexed we have taken into account the following appreciations concerning the threats to Hong Kong:

(68) — 11.

(a) Combined Services Hong Kong Appreciation No. 1

(as amended).

(b) Scale and Nature of Attack on the Colonics.

(JIC(49)5(Final)).

(c) The Threat to Hong kong.

(JP(49)44)

We have not been able to consult the Governor of Hong Kong in the time available but have taken into account all recent reports received from Hong Kong.

Conclusions

3.

We conclude that the return of Hong Kong to China is an important part of the Chinese Communists' programme, and that they will do their best to achieve this without recourse to open attack on the Colony. The only advantage which the continuation of British rule in Hong Kong presents to them is as an entrepot with a stable currency and mercantile facilities. Quite apart from the extent to which they may expect Shanghai to do duty in this respect, or Hong Kong itself after its return to Chinese Sovereignty, it is unlikely that doctrinal orthodoxy will in the long run yield to economic expediency. Nevertheless, the Communists, adopting a policy of opportunism, will be prepared to reap all the advantages that a British Hong Kong can offer for as long as it suits them, and especially while they are building up their subversive organization i inside the Colony and regrouping their forces after the occupation of Kwang tung. We estimate that these forces, which may comprise five PLA Armies (approximately 150,000) men with artillery and tanks, will not reach the vicinity of Canton before early July, and are unlikely to complete their re-organisation before mid-September.

•

During this period, which may well be prolonged, we can expect a demand for rendition, or at very least, for negotiations on the Colony's future. To back such a demand, pressure will be exerted by the massing of Communist regular forces on the border, by the instigation of industrial unrest within Hong Kong, and possibly by measures designed to bring the Colony's economic life to a standstill. If H.M. Government does not comply with the Communist demands, these activities will be pursued in progressive stages and on an increasing. scale and will probably be reinforced by guerilla raids across the

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