CO537-4999 — Page 62

ANNEX

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فا.

6.

Paragraph 11.

(a)

(b)

It is considered the capacity of the rail route Hankow-Changsha-Canton-Hong Kong to be more in the region of 4,000 tons per day in either direction (8 trains each way per day of 500 tons).

No mention has been made of a likely time of advance from Nanchang-Kanchow-Shinchow along the Kan river valley. A very large number of Communist forces are disposed already in the Nanchang area.

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7. Paragraph 17 (a) It is significant that the the Chinese Communists have so far taken care to whip up Chinese nationalist sentiment in their support, but have not yet made use of the most useful weapon of all the claim to Hong Kong. Hitherto all Chinese Governments have always taken precautions to maintain this claim, if not constantly to advance it. This restraint on the part of the vociferous and competent Chinese Communist broadcasting system can only have resulted from orders from above. Furthermore, although Chinese Communist propaganda is constantly denouncing the "unequal" treaties with foreign powers, that governing Hong Kong has never yet been mentioned. These omissions are perhaps further indirect evidence in support of the theory that the communists do not propose to take any immediate action to eject British rule from Hong Kong.

8. Paragraph 20. This paragraph presupposes the existence of a Chinese Communist Air Force. The Joint Intelligence Committee have no evidence that this is so, and believe that apart from a small number of defectors from the Nationalist Air Force the Chinese Communists have only some aircraft which are being used for training purposes at threc schools in Northern Manchuria. It is most unlikely that Soviet aircraft would be used before hostilitics exist between the Soviet Union and United Kingdom.

9.

Paragraph 29. It is considered that it is most unlikely that Soviet advisers will be attached to any Chinese forces which might attack Hong Kong. It has not hitherto been the practice of the Soviet Union to render overt assistance to countries engaged in hostilities against the West.

10. Paragraph 32. As sortie rates are discussed in the part of the paper immediately following this paragraph it would be helpful if the strength of the combat element of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force by types of aircraft were given, i.e.

Fighter bomber 145 Medium bomber Heavy bomber

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11. Paragraph 33. The potential efficiency of the Nationalist

The Force is Air Force appears to have been over-estimated. believed to possess approximately 100% reserves of aircraft and a large quantity of spares. However, even in the unlikely ovont of the whole of the Force defecting to the Communists it is improbable that any appreciable proportion of reserves or spares would be transferred from Formosa to the mainland.

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