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The Communists would therefore have difficulty in maintaining the defector's aircraft, and the maximum serviceability to be expected would be about 20%. Few of the aircrew have much experience of operations, and their morale is likely to be low in the absence of suitable cash incentives. Fuel and ommunition supplies would also present a major problem in the absence of Soviet assistance. The effectiveness of the Force on defection would therefore be low, and even if fuel and ammunition were sufficient. it is unlikely that it would be able to operate at a greater intensity than 300 700 sorties per month. Even if the force operates from Formosa, with the benefit of its existing spares and maintenance organisation, it is unlikely that it would achieve more than 1400 sorties per month. These rates would be decreased by casualties.

$

12. Paragraph 35. The air threat to Hong Kong would also appear to have been overca timated. Even if the whole of the Nationalist Air Force defects it is unlikely that the size of the initial raid would exceed:

Fighter bomber (if in range)

Medium bomber

Heavy bomber

70 aircraft

30 aircraft 12 aircraft

The highest rate that could be expected subsequently assuming 10% casualties on the firs raid is likely to be of the order of:-

1.

Fighter bomber

Modium bomber

Heavy bomber

1,000 250 25

Sorties per month.

Faragraph 38. According to the latest assessment the

Com mist naval strength shown in paragraph 38 appears to be out

of dats. J.I.C. (FE) will however in the meantime have

સ

réce.ved the fortnightly revic containing the new figures.

* J.I.C. (49) 44/4

J.I.C. (49) 4 Series

44

-

4

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