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SIR ARTHUR SANDERS said that he agreed with the assessment of the air threat set out in paragraphs 12 to 14 of Annex. He did not consider that it was very serious. He emphasised that to bring the fighter squadrons up to a unit equipment of 16 would entail the dispatch of aircraft from the United Kingdom. This would in turn have implications on other commitments. In the long term, he did not advocate the employment of Beaufighters as light bombers. A more suitable arrange- ment would be to dispatch another squadron of fighter bombers.

MR. SIDEBOTHAM said that the Commissioner General, South East Asia had recently represented that there would be considerable advantage in making a formal detailed announcement about our resources for the defence of Hong Kong. He would be interested to have the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the security implications of such an announcement. He noted that it was proposed by the Joint Planning Staff (paragraph 10 of Annex II) to hold the line from Tolo Harbour to Deep Bay. He thought it right to mention that such a policy would mean that a considerable part of the New Territories would be undefended and this might have an undesirable effect on morale. The supply situation in Hong Kong was fairly satisfactory at the moment. Existing stocks of rice on the island were as large as storage space would permit and he thought they should suffice for something of the order of three months. The bulk of the food supplies of Hong Kong came by sea and he did not therefore consider that the implications of economic land blockade would be as serious as the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff had envisaged.

made:

In a full discussion, the following points were

(a)

(b)

(c)

The Chiefs of Staff were opposed to an

announcement on the lines advocated by the Commissioner General". Apart from this, they were generally in agreement with the views expressed by Mr. McDonald.

Paragraph 22 (a) of Annex II should be

reworded as under:

"If we show our determi- nation to hold the Colony there is little likelihood of a direct Communist attack on Hong Kong.

It

The last sentence of paragraph 17 of

Annex I did not conform to paragraph 8 of Annex II. This could be rectified if the following amend- mont was made to the last two lines of paragraph 8. Delete and substitute "there is no likelihood of a Chine se Navy making any effective attempt in the presence of the Far Eastern squadron, "

+ Telogram No. 385 dated 30th April (67)

from Hong Kong

Telegram No. 385

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