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73

C.O.S.(44) 63.

EXTRACT FROM C.O.S.(49)

1.

THREAT TO HONG KONG

MEETING HELD 2/5/49

(TOP SECRET)

(Previous Reference C.o.s. (49) 62nd Meeting,

Minute

THE COMMITTEE considered:

(a). A report by the Joint Planning Staff

examining the throat likely to develop against Hong Kong and the military measures needed to meet it.

(b)

Λ

A note by the War Office setting out

notef the anti-aircraft reinforcements which were urgently required for Hong Kong.

SIR GERALD TEMPLER said that while he was in general agreement with Annex I to the report by the Joint Planning Staff, he noted that no mention had been made of one possible threat to Hong Kong, namely the threat of an economic land blockade. He feared that if the Chinese population of Hong Kong, which amounted to a total of some two million, were denied access to the sources of food supply on the mainland, a very serious situation might arise. Although this was in the main a political problem, the commitment of supplying the population by sea would have serious implications on the shipping situation.

Referring to Annex II, he said that the forces set out in paragraph 15 two infantry brigades and ancillary units would be adequate to deal with internal unrest and a large scale influx of refugees and external aggression by guerilla bands. To deal, however, with large scale aggression by the Communists, reinforcements of the order of one division would be needed. He did not consider that the paper brought out sufficiently clearly the difficulties of providing this force. In order to find the necessary manpower involved, it would be necessary to call up Section B of the Army Reservo. The mobilisation of the various units would also entail considerable equipment difficulties. This particularly applied in the case of accommodation stores. There were also the implications of moving the force to Hong Kong. The shipping requirement would certainly affect the export drive and might entail measures such as stopping all immigration shipping for six weeks. He considered that there should be some reference to this in the Paper.

Referring to paragraph 22 (a) of Annex II, he said that in the view of the War Office, this paragraph required strengthening. It was considered that unless we showed our determination to hold Hong Kong, there was a likelihood of a direct Communist attack on the island. It was certain that the Communist authorities would dispute our claim to Hong Kong and press for its return. Their morale was, ut present, high and they might well adopt more aggressive measures. He therefore felt that there was a considerable likelihood of an attack on Hong Kong unless we adopted strong measures to prevent it.

+ J.P. (49) 44 (68)

4. C.0.8. (49) 154 (71)

Paragraph 2 of D.O. (49) 32 refers NT 453

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