CO537-4998 — Page 75

(8651) Wt. 15174/D85 30m 6/48 C. & Co. 745(8)

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

WARNING The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

53

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FROM : G.H.Q. FAR EAST LAND FORCES

ΤΟ

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

SEACOS 896

From FEDSEC.

IZ 1209 TOO 271700GH (271030A)

TOR 271705A

27th. April, 1949.

For Chiefs of Staff from Commanders in Chief Committee, Far East.

1.

We have considered the need to re-inforce Hong Kong in relation to the situation in China and our theatre commitments.

2.

We consider that the trend of events in China is likely to have repercussions throughout the theatre in general. As regards Hong Kong in particular we are of the opinion that the threat to internal security is likely to increase and acts of terrorism on the Malayan pattern may be upon us at any moment. Although large Scale external aggression against the Colony is unlikely until the early Autumn, raids by guerilla bands to test our reactions might be staged earlier.

3.

In view of the above factors we are convinced that the re-inforcement of Hong Kong as soon as possible is necessary and also to indicate our determination to retain the Colony.

(2) کام

4.

You will have received SEACOS 895 giving the R.A.F. re-inforcements needed and no doubt Commander in Chief, Far East Station has informed the Admiralty of Naval requirements.

5.

We are reluctant to withdraw troops trained in jungle warfare serving in Malaya when the situation is steadily improving. In the long run it will pay us to continue the pressure in Malaya and so bring the dis- turbed conditions in the Federation to an end within a reasonable time thus making secure our main centre of influence in the theatre. If this is to be done it is at present impossible to forecast exactly when troops could be freed for re-inforcing Hong Kong and to rely upon units from Malaya for this task would be to risk their arriving in Hong Kong too late.

6.

Exactly when this risk in Malaya will diminish cannot at present be forecast and this depends partly on the conditions in Southern Siam where the elimination of bandits by the Siamese in conjunction with our troops and police is an absolute necessity towards peace and

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