CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 325

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defence of Hong Kong is based

ro years the likely strength

ed two or three divisions of rovided by a wasting air force

aspect of the defence of

"educing enony air attack to ested and vulnerable target

x considerable material damage an morale.

Colony which it is considered

Le strength of a defensivo

mute as compared with recent

c that an opposing air force

a bomber force supplemented by

forco may be supported by

}

in addition to which there

against us in the early

olustang type.

appoar that it is possible

force oquipped with efficient

ould be taken into account

an air force. These factors

2

cms

Ref.:

to the National Archives

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

? use of it may be

in that cong Yurther information is phen in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archive subject to copyrigh

led and badly trained ground

›ntrollera.

id airfield facilities,

went backing.

actors, it is considered that

excessive. Operational

e and bad flying coupled

as many aircraft as will be

N

002 72

N

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ร

N

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

6.

-33-

The ability of the enemy to operate by night may be assessed 28 very low. It is doubtul whether the standard of crow training cum produce many crews capable of filing liong Hong at night and returning safely to their bases in the dark. Operations of this nature can hardly be sustained in the light of indifferent cids and poor airfiold facilities available to the cncy. Hoonlight nights will be of considerable assistance to then in this respect, ono must balance against this, however, u advantage conferred on the night fighter by moonlight conditions.

7.

It is considered, zrforu, in the light of the above factors at the scale of onony dir attack in Hong Kong will probably, in the initial stages, consist of mixed babor formations of 30 to 40

ircraft escorted by 12 to lyd fighters. The fighting ability of this Tozoe is assessed as low in ruletion to the indifferent still end experience of the aircrews and controllers. There will, however, alwys be the oxcuption rnl vo ust count upon a nucleus of courageous anī sldlful pilots and crews. It is considered unlikely that such a scale of attack can be sustainal. Ich operational and non-operational casualtios will quickly reduce the effort to a stage where the oncny vill have to decide whether to operate sneak and run raids by enll formations or single aircraft by day or to resort to night babing. loither of those possibilities offer him much more than a nuisance value and both can be voll taken care of by a small and efficient fighter force with a nomcl operational backing.

6.

There is, however, ene Anal problem which is difficult to ASCOSE. It is considered that my calculations of the strength and efficiency of an opposing når foro should take into account tho possibility of an energetic ver lord taldng steps to supplement his air Corcos with equipment contributed by a major power, either on a firmncial or other basis. In addition, de obilized and disgruntled young aircrews of any nationality way easily be tempted by love of Soldiers of adventure coupled with a prorise of ligh emoluments. fortune of this category are capable of introducing an element of leadership, skill and courage into an air force of poor quality. problem of outside support camot be taken care of in its entireity but as an insurance, it is considered that defensive air forces in Hon, Kong should be designed to be slightly stronger than is necessary For defence against local air forces.

STRENGTH OF ONI FORCES.

9.

In order to provide reasonable security against the

This

situation outlined in the above paragraphs, it is considered that the following measures for defence are essential:-

An officient and modern fighter force.

Efficient Radar cover.

Fighter operations room, filter room and G. C. I. facilities to control the fighter forco. Anti-aircraft dofonce.

Facilitios for air lift.

A reinforcement plan.

سا

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hty be assessed

crow training

night and

ons of this nature

de and poor airfiold

will be of

ust balance against

ghter by noonlight

of the abovo

g will probably,

ons of 30 to 40

Chting ability of

erunt skill and

11, however,

us of courageous

cly that such a

nd non-operational

there the onomy vill

by all

ight ba bing.

in a nuisance valuo

cient fighter

is difficult to

10 strength and

.ccount the

upplerent his air

.ther on a

and disgruntled

d by love of

Soldiers of

eloment of

or quality.

its entireity

ir forces in

This

Han is necessary

ainst the

idered that the

I.