CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 324

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based on the assumption

gado Group, supported by

force will be as follows:

ivisional RECCE Regiment

Lon will be located in the roup will be responsible for Territories, excluding

times to be used offensively

ne Battalion will be 7loon

a Group to be in reserve

ist the Divisional Dofence

order in Hong Kong in the

to be responsible for the

ilong Kong.

al Navy to be able to lift

1-borne expedition. Either

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafer

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

SECTION VI

-12-

HONG KONG DEFENCE PLAN

AUR PLANI

00271

TOP SECRET

INTRODUCTION.

The following plan for the air defence of Hong Kong is based

on the assumption that during the next five years the likely strength

of any attack in the Colony would not exceed two or three divisions of enemy troops whose air support would be provided by a wasting air force with no backing.

2.

The first essential in the air aspect of the defence of Hong Kong is the paramount importana of reducing enemy air attack to the minimn. The Colony presents a congoated and vulnerable target where even desultory raids wight well cause considerable material damage and would have an adverse eficot on civilian moralo.

SCALE OF AIR ATTACK

3.

The scale of air attack on the Colony which it is considered can be mounted and in relation to which the strength of a defensivo fighter force should be planned is very minute as compared with rocont experience in air warfare. It may well be that an opposing air force

will consist a medium range twin-engined bomber force supplemented by modified transport aircraft. The bomber foren may be supported by medium rage fighters of the Tomahawk typo, in addition to which there is also the probability of the deployment against us in the early stages of long range escort fighters of the ustang type.

4.

Although from the a ove it may appear that it is possiblo

that we may be threatened by a modern air force equipped with efficient aircraft, there are other factors which should be taken into account when assossing the striking power of such an air force. These factors

aro:

5.

(a) A high rate of unservability.

(b)

(c)

Inefficient maintenance by unskilled and badly trained ground

crews,

Indifferent pilots, aircrew and controllers.

(a) Poor training.

(0)

(f)

Badly maintained and badly operated airfield facilities,

Non-existent production and equipment backing.

Taking into account the above factors, it is considered that casualties in the enemy air forces will be excessive. Operational casualties will be high and bad maintainance and bad flying coupled together will, it is estimated, account for as many aircraft as will be lost on optional sorties.

a note that this copy is

CO 537/1260

"THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

led subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright