CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 238

00 197

BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

has been strictly affed.

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bol chalmany

Copy No.

Please note that this copy is

Ref:

restrictions. Further information is ghe

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

subject to copyrigh

is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet,

5

F

aied for the consideration of as Chiefs of Staf

120314

8 OF STAFF COMMITTEE

NT PLANNING STAFF

KONG DEFENCE PLAN

the Joint Planning Staff

uctions, we have examined an

r-in-Chief, Hong Kong, of the

Kong and the New Territories during

tion

preciation is bageri on the

a the powers is unlikely for

ire; in any case he considers

3 indefensible against a

8808sion of the mainland

provision is, therefore, against a major attack.

of the Chinese Central

recover the colony by

and in their efforts

diplomatic support from .8.S.R.

reat to the security of

n infiltration of large

into the Chinese population

I unrest and boycott,

attacks on the European

threet is not a likely

il war breaks out in

Iong Kong.

ilt by a Chinese army

en, led by a Southern

sential throat.

pping is a possibility

tht march on Hong Kong

าย

internal unrest or

* 21th December, 1945.

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00198

cma

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and

Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Sumary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Report

3. We attach at Annex I a report by the Joint Intclligence Sub-Committee, in which they examine Sections II and III of the C.-in-C. 's appreciation.

This report shows that:-

(日)

The J.I.C. agree with C.-in-C. Hong Kong

regarding China's aspirations. There are indications, however, that the Chinese will not confine themselves to purely diplomatic means in bringing pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong

(b) A direct land assault on the New Territories,

coupled with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might have some effect on civilian morale) and limited mining from junks, is only likely in the future if open hostilities break out with the Central Government. The possibility of this within the next ten years is so remote as to be negligible.

(c) Hodern arms and equipment including aircraft

and transport, would not in all probability be available to a provincial War Lord, should one arise in S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai-Chok. The possibility

of an attack by a provincial War Lord

can also be excluded as long as a garrison

of approximately its present size is available

to act as a deterrent.

(a) The most likely form of attack is by infiltration

of a large number of agents into the Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interrupt ion of food and other suplies to the Colony. from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.

(e) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong

Kong cannot be controlled; orms up to and including L.M. G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.

(f) Piracy is probable at all times and is likely

to increase if the situation developed as in (d) above.

a result of internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would

(g) 3poradic guerille attacks es

be necessary to prevent the influx of armod desertera.

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