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BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
has been strictly affed.
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bol chalmany
Copy No.
Please note that this copy is
Ref:
restrictions. Further information is ghe
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
subject to copyrigh
is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet,
5
F
aied for the consideration of as Chiefs of Staf
120314
8 OF STAFF COMMITTEE
NT PLANNING STAFF
KONG DEFENCE PLAN
the Joint Planning Staff
uctions, we have examined an
r-in-Chief, Hong Kong, of the
Kong and the New Territories during
tion
preciation is bageri on the
a the powers is unlikely for
ire; in any case he considers
3 indefensible against a
8808sion of the mainland
provision is, therefore, against a major attack.
of the Chinese Central
recover the colony by
and in their efforts
diplomatic support from .8.S.R.
reat to the security of
n infiltration of large
into the Chinese population
I unrest and boycott,
attacks on the European
threet is not a likely
il war breaks out in
Iong Kong.
ilt by a Chinese army
en, led by a Southern
sential throat.
pping is a possibility
tht march on Hong Kong
าย
internal unrest or
* 21th December, 1945.
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2
00198
cma
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and
Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
Sumary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Report
3. We attach at Annex I a report by the Joint Intclligence Sub-Committee, in which they examine Sections II and III of the C.-in-C. 's appreciation.
This report shows that:-
(日)
The J.I.C. agree with C.-in-C. Hong Kong
regarding China's aspirations. There are indications, however, that the Chinese will not confine themselves to purely diplomatic means in bringing pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong
(b) A direct land assault on the New Territories,
coupled with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might have some effect on civilian morale) and limited mining from junks, is only likely in the future if open hostilities break out with the Central Government. The possibility of this within the next ten years is so remote as to be negligible.
(c) Hodern arms and equipment including aircraft
and transport, would not in all probability be available to a provincial War Lord, should one arise in S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai-Chok. The possibility
of an attack by a provincial War Lord
can also be excluded as long as a garrison
of approximately its present size is available
to act as a deterrent.
(a) The most likely form of attack is by infiltration
of a large number of agents into the Chinese population to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interrupt ion of food and other suplies to the Colony. from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.
(e) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong
Kong cannot be controlled; orms up to and including L.M. G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.
(f) Piracy is probable at all times and is likely
to increase if the situation developed as in (d) above.
a result of internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would
(g) 3poradic guerille attacks es
be necessary to prevent the influx of armod desertera.
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j