CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 239

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CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supose of may be subject

ly of National Archives'

a copyright

00 199

Policy for Defence of Hong Kong

4.

The strategical importance of Hong Kong lies in the fact that it may provide an operational naval and air base in the event of a future conflict in the Pacific. In addition, it is a British possession which has very great commercial value.

5. We do not consider that under modern conditions Hong Kong could be defended against attack by a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland. We should not, therefore, lock up in Hong Kong forces or defences which will either not be required, or overrun and lost.

6. In the period under review a case might be made out for defending Hong Kong against the ill armed forces which Chin, unsupported by any other power, is likely to have available. Since, however, the J.I.C. state that the possibility of wer with China in the next ten years is so remote as to be negligiblo, we do not consider it necessary to allow for this eventuality in assessing the scale of forces to be maintained in Hong Kong in peacetime.

7. Our long term polby should therefore be to provide for the possible need to use Hong Kong as an operational naval and air base, in a war in which the strategic Bituation makes its use desirable, by being prepared to instal at short notice the necessary scale of defences against air and/or naval attack from a distence.

8. We connot, however, as a short term policy, dispense with deterrent garrison forces in Hong Kong, in view of the opinion held both by C.-in-C. Hong Kong and by the J. I. C. regardin the possibility of attack by a Chinese War Lord.

to:-

The forces for this purpose should also be adequate

(a) Provide an armed backing to assist the

Police in maintaining internal security;

(b)

control the frontier;

(c)

protect shipping against piracy;

(a)

Ref.

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this cogy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

9.

uphold British prestige, and act as a deterrent to Chinese aspirationa.

We are unable to forecast the possible timing of reduction

of forces but wo consider the development of a properly organised and armed police force will enable some of the above duties now handled by garrison forces to be taken over by the police.

Requirements for Defence of Hong Kong

10.

On the basis of the policy set out in the previous paragraphs, we have examined at Annex II C.-in-C. Hong Kong's detailed recommendations, and the following is a summary

of our conclusions:-

(0)

We agree generally with C.-in-C. Hong Kong's

requirements for naval forces. We consider, however, that the 4 BYMS and the L.3.I. (M) are not required.

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