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ཀ ། ། །
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :-
C.O.882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- | COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO
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10. As regards the time-limit to be given for compliance, we under- stood that General Li Chai-sum at his interview with Mr. Brenan on the 16th May had agreed to give an answer in three days' time, i.e., on the 19th May. The inquiries necessary to be made by General Li were of the simplest nature, the outrage having been commmitted in the immediate vicinity of Canton. We considered, therefore, that if he did not reply on the 19th May the only possible inference was that he did not mean to comply, and in such circumstances the shorter the time-limit the better. Moreover, rapidity and surprise were of great importance in connection with the sanctions we considered essen- tial. We concluded, therefore, that if General Li did not comply on the 19th May, Mr. Brenan should on that day present an ultimatum requiring compliance within 24 hours, failing which the Bogue forts should be captured at dawn on the 21st May and the Dane Island defences as soon as possible thereafter. I telegraphed in this sense to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Sir R. Y. Tyrwhitt, on the 18th May.
11. Meanwhile, as a menacing gesture, H. M. S. Dauntless proceeded to Canton on the 19th May and anchored near Dane Island, and on the same day a demonstration was made over the Dane Island de- fences, at the scene of the attack on s.s. Lungshan, by a flight of seven British seaplanes.
12. On the 19th May Sir R. Tyrwhitt replied to my telegram of the preceding day that, personally, he considered the firing of a few rifles at a local steamer as an act of undisciplined soldiers, which could only be dealt with summarily; that he considered the punishment proposed to be far in excess of the gravity of the crime; that it could mean nothing else than a declaration of war on China, and that it was doubtful whether His Majesty's Government would support me. He added that he was reporting my proposal with his own remarks. as above, to the Admiralty.
13. However, on the previous day (18th May) Mr. Brenan, having received from Sir Miles Lampson a telegram dated 17th May agreeing to the former's recommendations in his original telegram of the 16th May-namely, demands for immediate punishment of offenders and apology, failing which retaliatory action to be taken in accordance with Admiralty telegram No. 812 of the 11th May-despatched to the Canton Ministry for Foreign Affairs the document* of which I attach a copy, repeating his three previous demands, adding that the com- pensation required was 8200 and that, as regards punishment of the offenders, that of the officer directly responsible for this murderous attack, which might have cost several lives, should include a term of “ imprisonment, and concluding that all these demands "must be com- plied with in full on or before Monday, the 23rd May, failing which the British authorities reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they may consider appropriate."
14. On the 19th May, in telegram No. 37 to the Foreign Office,† Mr. Brenan reported what he had done, adding: As regards sanctions I approve proposal of Senior Naval Officer, West River (i.e., Commander J. U. P. Fitzgerald) for destruction of matshed barracks and gun
+ Enclosure in Q. 30025/27 | No, 85]: not printed.
Not printed.
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positions. Hong Kong Governor's desire for capture of Bogue forts and Dane Island, which contains Military Academy, seems to me out of proportion to offence which caused no material damage, and beyond intention of Admiralty telegram, although such action may become necessary later if Chinese show fight, which is unlikely." Mr. Brenan also telegraphed on the 19th May, to His Majesty's Consuls at Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai as follows: "Demands for apology, punishment, and compensation have been presented to Canton Government for firing on British ship by soldiers at Whampoa. If not complied with on or before 23rd May, forts will be attacked by Navy. Be ready for local repercussion."
15. A very difficult position had thus been created, for Sir R. Tyrwhitt's telegram of the 19th May appeared to indicate that in his opinion the whole affair was too trivial for any punitive action what- ever, as none had been possible at the moment of the outrage, while His Majesty's Consul-General at Canton had nevertheless presented to the Canton Government a written ultimatum with time-limit expir ing on the 23rd May, and had warned all British Consulates in South China that "forts would be attacked by the Navy," if the demands in the ultimatum were not complied with.
16. Accordingly, I held a further conference on the 20th May, attended by General Luard, Rear-Admiral Boyle, Commodore Pearson, We were Mr. Southorn, Sir J. H. Kemp and Mr. Hallifax. unanimously of opinion that, in view of the fact that Mr. Brenan had already presented an ultimatum with a time-limit expiring on 23rd May, it was essential that some retaliation should take place, should his demands, which were very moderate, not be complied with. We re-affirmed our view that unprovoked firing on British ships in the West River must be drastically checked at the outset and that, whether or not the Lungshan outrage was the act of undisciplined soldiers, if General Li did not punish the offenders and comply with the Consul- General's demands, the Canton Government would be identified with this wanton anti-British outrage. As regards the sanctions to be taken, we first considered Commander Fitzgerald's proposal to destroy by gunfire the matshed barracks and gun positions on Dane Island, after a warning to evacuate. Rear-Admiral Boyle and Commodore Pearson, for technical reasons, considered that such an operation should not be attempted; and after full discussion we all remained of opinion that the only effective and adequate sanction would be the capture of the Such an operation would Bogue forts and Dane Island defences.
not mean war on China, for "China" politically no longer exists. But it would be the best means of restoring British prestige in southern China and discouraging any further anti-British manifestations in Kwang-tung. The Military Academy on Dane Island is notoriously Bolshevik. Moreover, Mr. Brenan himself had admitted and we agreed that, if the Chinese showed fight it would become necessary to capture the Bogue forts and Dane Island defences. If, however, some minor operation at Dane Island were first undertaken, we should lose the advantage of surprise in the major operation. Finally, we decided that we would again strongly recommend the capture of the Bogue forts and Dane Island defences as the best sanction, but add that, if His Majesty's Government did not agree, any small retaliatory act of