CO885-11 — Page 201

201

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

I l l Į Į l l l l l l l l l | ||

56

destruction should be done from the air, and that in such case in- cendiary bombs should be dropped by British aircraft on the matshed barracks situated at the spot where the firing on s.s. Lungshan took place. I telegraphed to you in this sense on the 20th May, and you replied next day* that you presumed no action of any kind would be taken without Sir R. Tyrwhitt's approval.

17. On the 20th May the Canton Ministry for Foreign Affairs answered Mr. Brenan's ultimatum in the lettert of which I attach a copy. This letter states:-

(a) That the Company Commander and the Platoon Commander of the men responsible for the outrage would each have a severe reprimand recorded against them and be fined half a month's pay, and that the troops who fired would be dismissed;

(b) That the acting Martial Law Commander, Cheung Wa-fu, had been instructed on the 21st May, together with a deputy from the Wai Chiao Pu, to go aboard a British warship anchored at Whampoa and render an explanation;

(e) That as regards the demand for indemnity the damage was very small and perhaps it might be as well for the amount that should be paid to be determined after investigation by two (or more) officers, one deputed from each party.

Mr. Brenan replied to the Canton Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the attached memorandum,† dated 21st May, that his three extremely moderate demands must be complied with in full by the time stated. 18. On the 21st May Sir R. Tyrwhitt telegraphed to Rear-Admiral Boyle: If General Li Chai-sum has not apologized by 11 a.m. on Monday, 23rd May, and he has been warned that action is going to be taken, I authorize your destruction of the matshed barracks with On incendiary bombs at the spot where the Lungshan was fired at." the same day acting Martial Law Commander Cheung Wa-fu, in uniform, accompanied by an Aide-de-camp and by a civilian deputy from the Canton Ministry for Foreign Affairs, went on board H.M.S. Dauntless and stated that he had come to apologize for firing on the W. Macpherson, R. N., accepted the Lungshan. Captain K. D. apology.

19. There remained the questions of punishing the offenders, and pay- ment of compensation, neither of which had been settled to Mr. Brenan's satisfaction, but to neither of which Sir R. Tyrwhitt's tele- gram of the 21st May made any reference. The position of affairs was reported to Sir R. Tyrwhitt by Rear-Admiral Boyle on the 22nd May, and the former replied that nothing was to be done until Mr. Brenan had reported to him. Next day, however, on the 23rd May, at the time fixed for expiration of the ultimatum, Mr. Brenan telegraphed that all his demands had been complied with in full and that the incident was closed.

20. I have set out in detail the circumstances of this affair, because there are several important principles involved, to which I have the honour to invite your special attention. In the first place, I think this

+ Not printed.

* O. 30025/27 [Nos. 86 and 88]: not printed,

57

episode affords a remarkable illustration of the excellent results which can always be obtained in China by firmness in support of a just cause. The Canton Authorities knew very well that they had a bad case. The attack on the s.s. Lungshan was outrageous and in- defensible. The Canton Authorities also knew very well that ample naval and military forces at Hong Kong were available for retribu- tion, if they misbehaved. During the past week a British brigade has reinforced the Hong Kong garrison. The First Cruiser Squadron is at anchor in Hong Kong Harbour; and aircraft are to be seen daily flying over Hong Kong and the New Territory. The sight of H.M.S. Dauntless off Dane Island, and the demonstration by seven British seaplanes over Dane Island, made the Canton Authorities believe that at long last His Majesty's Government mean business and that some- thing serious would happen if Mr. Brenan's ultimatum was not com- plied with to the letter. Accordingly, as Chinese always will do under such circumstances, they at once gave in. Mr. Brenan is much to be congratulated on the firm front he displayed under very trying condi- tions, and I hope that the advantage so gained may not be thrown away by weakness in connection with any future incident.

21. In the next place, I invite you to observe the immense difficulty of obtaining prompt and effective action when the decision as to what action should be taken does not rest with the men on the spot. In this particular episode there were involved :-

(a) The Consul-General at Canton and the Senior Naval Officer, West River;

(b) The Hong Kong Government and the Naval and Military Authorities in Hong Kong:

(c) The Naval Commander-in-Chief, who was in the Yangtze, and who has only been able to spend three or four days in Hong Kong since he assumed duty on the China station;

(d) His Majesty's Minister at Peking, who has only spent a couple of days in Hong Kong since he assumed duty. When the crisis comes at any point, these scattered authorities can rarely (if ever) meet for consultation, and telegrams are a very un- satisfactory substitute, especially as local conditions are not equally well known to all the authorities concerned. I fully recognize that a great step towards better organization has been made by the decision of His Majesty's Government to vest a wide discretion in the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the China station. Action in every detail is thus no longer directed from London. But I think that a study of the facts of this case shows that even more discretion must be vested in the men on the spot if British prestige is to be maintained and British trade safeguarded under the chaotic and anarchic conditions now pre- vailing in China. In paragraph 7 of my secret despatch of the 23rd July, 1926,* I urged that full discretion as to the use of armed force in dealing with outrages on the frontier of this Colony or by Chinese pirates in its vicinity should be allowed to the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong (if the Naval Commander-in-Chief was not him- self here), to the Officer Commanding the Forces in Hong Kong and to myself acting in co-operation and in unanimity. But in view of sub- sequent experience I would now go further and recommend that, as

*C. 16818/26 not printed.

Reference :-

C.O.882/11

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-

COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO