52
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the suggestion now made is to have effect, it would be necessary to ascertain whether the Chinese Navy would undertake the duty of preventing Russian and Chinese ships from trading with Canton. I draw attention in this connection to my secret despatch of the 20th January.*
4. We are all agreed that the main cause of the anti-British boycott was the presence and influence of Russian Bolshevists at Canton and that their removal is essential for the relief of the present situation. It would have an excellent effect if action by His Majesty's Government at Moscow could secure the with- drawal of Borodin and all his Bolshevik co-adjutors from Kuang- tung. We attach very great importance to this suggestion and In this connection, however, hope that it may be acted upon." please see my telegram of the 13th January,† to which I have as yet received no reply.
.
5. If the proposals made in the preceding paragraphs are not considered practicable, then the only other active measure we can suggest is war with Canton. This might take the form of a Naval blockade of the West River delta, the annexation of the New Territories of Hongkong and the military, occupation of Sham- chun and Sha-t'au-kok. Please see in this connection my secret We are, however, unanimously despatch of the 19th January. I
of opinion that warlike action against Canton would imperil future trade relations between Great Britain and China, and especially between Hongkong and Canton, unless Japan, France and the United States at least, and preferably the other Maritime Powers as well, are prepared to co-operate. Such action would necessitate the prior evacuation of all British subjects from Shameen, Canton and the interior regions of Kuang-tung, in order to save them It would from massacre or attack by an infuriated populace. inevitably extinguish for the time being such trade as, in spite of the boycott, still exists between Hongkong and Kuang-tung; and it would very possibly, even if Great Britain had the co-operation of other Maritime Powers, be strongly resented by the rest of China, thus causing an extension of local conditions to the treaty- ports elsewhere. It would, moreover, almost certainly leave a legacy of hate to future generations which might subsequently prejudice British interests in China generally and especially in Hongkong and Kuang-tung.
6. If none of the active measures suggested in this despatch are considered by His Majesty's Government to be practicable, then we could only adhere to the passive attitude indicated in my tele- gram of the 13th January,† and we are agreed that in such case there is no means of ending the boycott except by holding out until the present Canton Government is overthrown either by internal disruption or by the attack of some hostile Chinese general. The former contingency is, in our opinion, more likely than the latter; but neither seems imminent at present. There- fore, our only remaining weapon is the Trade Loan (see my con- fidential despatches of 24th December§ and 15th January¶), and this loan must be used generously for the benefit of British and Chinese merchants in Hongkong even at the risk of some eventual loss of money to the Government.
•C 4487-285; not printed. C4450 26: not printed.
+ C1149 26S; not printed.
SC 2128/26; not printed. *C 4957 26; not printed
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7. As regards the interchange of political information concern- ing South China, there is close liaison between Sir James Jamieson and myself, and we do not see how the present system can be improved. The Peking Government of to-day has no authority or influence over Kuang-tung affairs and H.M. Minister at Peking is, under existing conditions, powerless to help British interests in Hongkong or in Kuang-tung. He is, however, kept fully informed by Sir James Jamieson of the course of events at Canton, and I inform him of any useful political news which comes to my knowledge in Hongkong. Nothing further appears to be necessary at this end, and I can only suggest a similar inter- change of information at your end between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office.
8. This despatch confirms and amplifies my telegram of to-day's date, which has been repeated to Peking.
I have, &c.,
C. CLEMENTI.
ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 6.
Governor, &c.
Foreign Office telegram No. 16 of 12th January.
Notes on points raised therein.
1. There cannot be any more prompt or satisfactory inter- change of news between Canton, Hongkong, Peking and the Foreign Office than exists at present. The appointment of a Governor conversant with Chinese-spoken and written-facili- tates direct communication between himself and the Consul- General, as it is unnecessary for him to consult heads of Departments prior to replying to private letters addressed to him by the latter. No relations between the two-places could have been more intimate than those existing when Sir Henry May a similarly qualified official-was Governor, and there is no reason whatsoever why they should not now be re-established. The practice introduced after the Seamen's Strike of 1922, namely that of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs making regular visits to Canton in order to exchange information and news, should, when normal conditions are restored, of course, be resumed.
Hongkong receives copies of all despatches-telegraphic or other-addressed by Canton to Peking or the Foreign Office, and urgent messages go forward by naval wireless.
Copies of despatches addressed to His Majesty's Minister are sent direct to the Foreign Office in order to save time, and similarly all telegrams of importance are repeated.
*C 2166/26; not printed.
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference :--
TILTIC.O. 882/11
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON|
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO