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The only additional step that suggests itself is that Hongkong send copies of its despatches on the political situation, addresse: to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Peking and Canton, and that the Colonial Office furnish copies thereof to the Foreign Office.

2. It is agreed that the only methods of putting an end to the present situation are:-

(a) An international blockade of the mouths of the West and Pearl Rivers by the Maritime Powers, thus cutting off essential imports such as rice and coal, and preventing the Co- export of silk-the most valuable of native products. operation of this nature it may not be easy to obtain for obvious reasons already stated, and for Great Britain to act individually would be impolitic, as the odium thereby created would fall on us alone. Moreover, it would mean the evacua- tion of all British subjects from Shameen, Canton and up- country districts in order to save them from massacre 'attack by an infuriated populace. It might also be strongly resented by the rest of China, thus causing an extension of local conditions to other ports which could not so readily be isolated.

or

Finally, such action being tantamount to a declaration of war, would, apart from leaving a legacy of hate to future generations (cf. how the so-called opium war is to-day being Hlung in our teeth), be eminently calculated to excite hostile comment at home and abroad.

(b) Assisting financially and materially some Northern or Central Chinese faction to launch a military or naval expedi- tion against Kuang-tung, with a view to driving out the This present Government and their Soviet coadjutors. would constitute a radical departure from the wise and sane policy of non-interference with China's internal affairs, and even were it successful would only throw back the province into the state of anarchy and chaos out of which the measure of Nationalist Party are striving, not without a success to extricate it.

Alien-i.e. non-Cantonese-domination would not for long be tolerated, and, outside the party, one can see no native of the province who, if placed in power, would be likely to main- tain himself unaided.

(c) A surrender to the political demands of the Strike Com- mittee, e.g., the right to elect their own members to the Legislative Council, and the introduction of Chinese mone- tary units into the Colony. That such demands should be put forward and insisted upon by citizens of a country in which the elective principle, as applied to political or municipal affairs, nowhere obtains, or is reduced to a farce, and in which no sound currency exists, savours of the ludicrous, and it is unthinkable that foreigners should be permitted to dictate the terms on which the constitution of a British Colony shall be revised.

It cannot in this connection be too strongly emphasised that, starting originally as a demonstration against incidents

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on the mainland, with which Hongkong had no connection whatsoever, this boycott, which, except for a possible griev- ance in respect of high rent charges in Victoria, is not one having an economic basis, but is, at Soviet instigation, being utilised in order to bring about, if such be possible, the com- mercial downfall of the Colony and a reorganisation of its political life on Communistic lines. The Southern Govern- ment, citing as a precedent the fact that British strike deputations in England have interviews with British Prime Ministers, wish to force the British Government of Hong- kong into the humiliating position of negotiating directly with the strikers, who claim to be purely Chinese citizens, preposterous political demands, reserving to themselves, in case of an impasse, a mediatory role. In view of the fact that overtures towards a settlement were initiated by them, through their Minister of Finance, it is obvious that nego- tiations with regard to the demands can only be either of tripartite nature, or between the two Governments alone.

(d) A recognition of the Government in power here as. what they assert it to be, the Nationalist Government of China. One might put them in a serious quandary were one to suggest that we would do so, provided they furnish us with proofs that they can rule and effectively control the rest of the Republic. As it would be impossible for them to furnish such proofs they would be compelled to acknowledge their incapacity so to do, thus inferentially nullifying their absurd claim.

3. Any expedition, purely Chinese, organised by parties in the north, unless of overwhelming strength and composed of highly efficient troops, is foredoomed to failure, and, short of that, the sole alternative would seem to be to continue inactive in the hope that the strike will collapse through disintegration.

16th January, 1926.

Paraphrase.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 6. [TELEGRAM.]

From Peking No. 4. (Despatched 13th January, 1926.) (Received 10 p.m., 13th January.)

J. JAMIESON.

Following telegram received from Foreign Office, No. 15 of January 12th.

With reference to Canton telegram of January 9th* we think that advantage might be taken of the approaching visit of Mr. O'Malley to Hongkong to arrive at an agreed expression of views by yourself, the Governor of Hongkong and the Consul General at Canton as to what you consider a sound and practical

* Not printed.

PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE

Reference :--

TELEC.O. 882/11

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC- COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH-NOT TO

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON