PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE
Reference -
CO. 885
4PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHIC-
COPYRIGHT PHOTOGRAPH—NOT TO
56
has the same language, the same traditions and aims as ourselves. She is developing amazingly side by side with our own family, she is proud of our history as reflecting upon herself, she imitates and rivals our institutions, and she will, like ourselves, never encourage the art of war with a view of promoting that which she knows full well never can follow in the wake of a purely warlike policy, namely, wealth, progress, and material development for her people and her industries.
It was stated, I believe correctly, that during the late Russo-Turkish campaigns there were eleven ships of war flying the Russian flag in San Francisco Harbour, all in first rate order. They had about 2,000 men on board, and a larger number of guns than in the whole of our squadron distributed from Chili to Vancouver Island,
What could have been the object of that squadron but to harass British possessions, and prey on British commerce upon a declaration of war? It is surely, therefore, in view of a very possible recurrence of the same state of things, of paramount importance that Esquimalt should be strongly and thoroughly armed and strengthened as our great Daval basis and telegraph and railway terminus on the North Pacific, and that, as a standard of efficiency and instruction, at least 100 marine artillerymen should be permanently stationed there, as I have had the honour so frequently before to recommend.
It only requires a glance at the general chart of the world to notice the various lines which mark out the great highway from port to port upon which the ocean commerce of the world chiefly passes, Almost without an exception, every one of the most important of those lines begins or ends at, or passes through, some British possession. There is but one great gap in the system of defence supplied by our foreign possessions, that is the line which begins at Vancouver Island and ends at the Falklands, through the Straits of Magellan, around Cape Horn. That line is flanked by foreign countries, and we have no station within those limits, which lie about 7,000 miles apart, where we can post a defensive squadron, or, still more important, have a secure and certain base for telegraph intelligence, coal, and other indispensable sea stores and naval supplies. But we hold at least one end of that line at Vancouver Island firmly within our grasp, and still more shall we do so when its fortifications are improved and the Canadian Pacific Railway across the Continent is completed on British soil. We have also a hold of the other end of the line through the Straits of Magellan, at the Falkland Islands.
If, therefore, we maintain the positions we have got and add securely to their defences, and, by so doing, prevent the only class of cruizers that can be sent abroad by such an enemy as Russia from detaining supplies of coal, the danger from such cruizers need not greatly be apprehended.
True, perhaps, at the outbreak of war, they probably would do much mischief, because they would be ready and we might be tardy. And they would start with full coal bunkers and supplies, which, by our holding possession of Vancouver and Nanaimo mines, they would find great difficulty in replenishing. I trust, therefore, it may be apparent how extremely and vitally important it is to maintain our commanding position at Vancouver Island, with the naval arsenal, dockyard, magazines, and coal mines, our railway and telegraph terminus, and to defend and render them practically impregnable against attack.
I venture to submit, on the other hand, how hazardous a policy it might prove in time of danger to remove from one strong and important base at Esquimalt, to risk our coal depot and naval arsenal upon any island whatever in the Pacific Ocean, to which the munitions of war would have to be transported by sca, and where, if strong batteries were not built and armed and adequately garrisoned, bur base of supplies would be "en l'air," in danger of being captured and destroyed by an enemy's squadron, or the supplies appropriated by themselves.
The necessity for a graving-dock for the Pacific squadron in time of war is a question of no light importance, more apparent now than in former years, since we have evidence that, should our enemy be Russia, her naval operations may probably be as strongly developed in the Pacific as on the Atlantic Ocean.
The object of sending the " Cimbria" from the Baltic to American waters, and into an American port last year, with a cargo of heavy long-range rifled guns and some 600 Russian seamen, was no secret. We know that fast cruizers were purchased, and two, I believe, actually fitted out to prey on British commerce and bombard and lay waste Canadian ports; we have even learnt that Russian naval officers openly declared such to be the intention with which these cruizers would have put to sca.
It is not quite probable that this new mode of attempting to cripple England on both oceans may not have taken a firm hold on Russian policy, and, should we go to war, may not another or more formidable "Cimbria " appear in an American Pacific port with similar intent
57
and object? In that event her cruizers will scour the seas in search of British merchantmen. Her now extensive Asiatic home stations at Petropaulowski, the Amoor, and Vladivostock, with telegraph lines direct from St. Petersburgh, might possibly enable her to have a preponderance of naval power on the Pacific, unless our fleet were reinforced and our naval base and railway and telegraph terminus at Vancouver Island were fortified and amply garrisoned beforehand.
Even now Russia is preparing such a number of merchant steamers, fitted with guns, as cruizers, as to attract considerable attention in England, and the question is asked, Why do not we, with our world-wide Colonies and vulnerable points, do likewise? Would it not be wise to take precautions in time and not wait till our merchant-ships and our outlying stations, such as Esquimalt, might be in flames-millions of property destroyed -rather than expend a few thousands in fortifying our coasts and rendering secure such commanding and important points as Esquimalt must undoubtedly be in case of a long maritime war?
Before concluding this Report, which I regret to observe has already attained undue proportions, I wish to draw attention to the effect of the railway and the impolicy of removing British naval protection from Vancouver Island.
The people of British Columbia are very loyal, and desire to remain closely united with England, but they feel that their interests have been sometimes overlooked, and there is no knowing how they might act if once they found themselves free to act according to their interests.
The colonists who live there and are familiar with the state of the country? its position, and surroundings are satisfied that this trans-continental railway will be of immense importance to the English Government, and they regard it much more as an Imperial question than as a Canadian one. It would open a magnificent country for settlement to the surplus population of Great Britain, who would, upon their arrival there, find themselves part of a population thoroughly English in their thoughts and ways, and bound to England by the strongest ties.
This railway passing through the "fertile belt"-a magnificent country capable of raising a food supply sufficient for Great Britain-it would open up direct communica- tion with the whole of British North America, China, India, Japan, and Australia, and the large supplies of Eastern produce required by Canada would go by this route and help to develop trade in a community who draw their manufactures in a great quantity from England, instead of, as at present, going through and helping to build up American
interests.
The railway will, from Nanaimo, ultimately reach Esquimalt as its ocean terminus, and a strong naval station must consequently be maintained there in the interests of Great Britain, British Columbia, and, for the reasons I have pointed out relating to the inhabitants of that magnificent but remote province, of the Dominion.
I cannot end without saying, in justice to an excellent and very promising young officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin, R.A., that the reasons which weighed in selecting Lieutenant-Colonel Strange to prooceed upon this joint commission were three :-
1. He is the senior of the two Artillery Inspectors and an officer of acknowledged high professional attainments, specially anxious to be so employed.
2. It was considered desirable that the opportunity should be given to at least a second artillery officer to understand the defences of Esquimalt and Victoria, and to report upon them.
3. Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin had no desire so soon again to undertake the long and fatiguing journey twice across the American Continent. The manner in which he faithfully and skilfully fulfilled his previous mission having already called for my strong approbation, which I expressed in transmitting his able Report for the information of this Government and of the Colonial and War Ministers in England.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
The Hon. the Minister of Militia and Defence.
[1093]
ED. SELBY SMYTH, Lieut.-General.
R