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The position of Esquimalt with reference to the Straits of Fuca, the Channels of Haro and Rosario, the Straits of San Juan, the entrance of the Puget Sound, and the general configuration of the locality, seem to be most admirably adapted for protection

and command.

Once the railway is in working order the question of supplies,, reliefs, &c., will receive the most satisfactory solution, and the contiguity of the American frontier, with their depôt for coal at Puget Sound, and the otherwise unprotected terminus at Burrard Inlet, seem to furnish the strongest arguments in favour of retaining Esquimalt Harbour, and rendering it thoroughly secure as a naval station and marine depôt.

I may, perhaps, briefly refer to the coal mines at Nanaimo more in detail, for I almost doubt whether their value is as yet thoroughly understood and appreciated either on this or the other side of the Atlantic.

In 1875, for instance, I understand the output was over 110,000 tons, there were three Companies at work with plant, including eighteen engines, six steam-pumps, and communicating by tramway with the coaling wharves, which are 500 feet long, with a depth of water sufficient to permit the largest ocean steamer in the Pacific to come alongside.

The Director of the Canadian Geological Survey pronounced the Canadian Pacific coal-fields to be of vast extent; its enormous coal deposits must always render it a strong point for Imperial defence.

There is no reason why Vancouver Island should not be the great coal emporium, not only for the North Pacific, but for the whole of Western America. The Pacific steam traffic is even now dependent upon the supply of coal from Vancouver, and I think, in view of these immense advantages, it would appear approaching the suicidal to abstain from strengthening our position in that direction.

The construction, again, of the Canadian Pacific Railway will eventually render it easy to convey any reintoreements required by land in time of war; the route decided upon has been already located, and a considerable portion of it from Thunder Bay on Lake Superior has been constructed towards the west; tenders are out for further extension, and for the building, the line from Yale to Kamloops on the Fraser River, the portion from Yale or Hope to Burrard Inlet, will probably soon be undertaken. From Burrard Inlet, the distance is only a few miles across the Gulf of Georgia tu Nanaimo and from thence to Esquimalt; the completion of the Pacific end of the railway will be a matter of no engineering difficulty nor requiring much time.

As I have stated, the present force of one battery of artillery and two companies of infantry at Victoria would be quite insufficient, but the railway will by-and-by transport reinforcements, and we must always rely as well upon the Royal Navy, for Great Britain cannot possibly neglect the advantages Esquimalt affords as a strategic naval base in the North Pacific.

We must not lose sight of the material progress in naval strength and resource which the Russians are rapidly developing at Petropaulowski and the mouth of the Amoor River, the former only 4,500 miles distant from Vancouver, and the latter but about 500 miles further. In the event of war, Russia would be in a position to harass, not only Hong Kong and our China and Japan trade, but to send a squadron across the ocean in thirty days to attack the western seaboard of the Dominion. This, in the possible absence of the British squadron would, unless properly fortified beforehand, be in a great measure at the enemy's mercy.

What the result would of such a hostile descent upon these shores, where so many Great monuments of British industry and energy exist, must awaken grave thought. Britain cannot, therefore, withdraw her naval protection from her North Pacific possessions, which the Dominion has conjointly already spent a large sum in partially fortifying.

If naval history proves anything, it proves that the Commander of a sea-going squadron must have full discretion, and that his success will be proportionate to bis self- reliant genius; to restrict that quality may not be advantageous; telegraphic communi- cation, on the other hand, is a very important element which cannot be overlooked. Although it might not be prudent to send a continuous stream of instructions to the Commander of a squadron, yet the telegraph must play an important part in future naval warfare.

Therefore, in the case of British Columbia, where the wires can run across the Continent on British territory, it makes it all the more important that Vancouver should ever continue to be our naval base in the North Pacific.

The Russian peace system of cruizing is usually by squadrons, while our mode of protecting commerce is frequently by single ships. These would have to be rapidly

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collected on the outbreak of war by the carliest telegraphic notice from England to the

naval base.

On the opposite side of the Continent, Halifax is the Imperial fortress designed, heavily fortified and maintained as an important base of naval operations in the North Atlantic. Our North Pacific fleet struggling without a telegraphic base, without a secure and well-fortified coal depot, dependent perhaps on an island in mid-ocean for its coaling and supply station, might, I submit, be sometimes in a precarious condition.

nced.

It must be foreseen that, in a long naval war, it might not be possible to keep an island depot supplied by coal transports, nor might it be possible to protect it against attack, or it might be the total annihilation of the coal stock and naval arsenal by fire,

Supposing Vancouver Dockyard given up and an island in mid-ocean selected as a coaling station instead, in the event of war our Pacific squadron must then rely for coal upon New South Wales or England, but notably upon Vancouver, and perhaps all three. Wherever it comes from it must be carried by colliers to whatever island point might be selected, and how many of these colliers might fall into the enemy's hands en route, supplying them at sea with the very material of which they would so much stand in Now, where a dockyard and arsenal already exist, where a graving-dock for repair of disabled ships is in course of construction, where unlimited deposits of coal abound, where land forces are at hand, and, on completion of the Pacific Railway, can in ten or twelve days be reinforced from Ontario, where land batteries already stand, and, if necessary, can be easily supplemented, where there is now a telegraphic terminus, and, perhaps not the least noteworthy feature, where a loyal and a brave people can be thoroughly relied on to rally round for powerful and willing support, appears in my humble judgment to stamp Esquimalt as the place before any other on the Pacific where our naval basis and coaling station should be maintained.

say,

To abandon such a naval base would appear to me to run the risk of being, in the event of sudden hostilities, swept out of the Pacific by a naval Power that has had ample time to concert its measures; and we must remember that, supposing we are swept out of the Pacific, and an enemy has got possession of all our stores and coals, and other means that are in Vancouver Island, our important base of operations, he has shut us out of it entirely, and if we were to send a powerful squadron round the Horn to try to recover our supremacy on the Pacific, on what should we depend? We should be with- out any base, and at the greatest disadvantage in trying to recover that which, I must I think we should never run the risk of losing. I am far from an advocate for dispersing our forces at a number of points which, perhaps, might not produce much effect in a general war, but I do consider that an important point such as that on which we really must depend for everything in the North Pacific, must never be left at the risk of falling into an enemy's hands as his coal station, nor be abandoned by us in any way.

The importance of Vancouver as our naval base, and the consequences which must be evident to all thoughtful and experienced officers of losing it, renders the railway across the Dominion one vitally concerning the whole Empire, and for these various reasons it is paramountly important that Vancouver Island should never be abandoned by our ships of war.

The harbour of Esquimalt, as I have already stated, can be easily defended; its position is naturally one of strength, easily approached from the Strait of Fuca, and available for ships of any tonnage or draught of water to enter by day or night at any time of tide, with depth of water varying from 7 to 9 fathoms, low spring tides. They can anchor in a safe roadstead, protected from the effects of wind and sea.

In making these observations I naturally keep in view that Russia might be the enemy against which we must take precautions, for with respect to our neighbour over the border I think we need not give ourselves the slightest anxiety. It is true the American frontier has been advanced, so that our channel entrance from the south to Nanaimo can be commanded by American guns from the Island of San Juan, which we have allowed to become American ground.

There is an American military post (formerly the barracks of our Royal Marines) on the island within sight of our city of Victoria, another at Port Townshend, about 40 miles up Puget Sound, and another at Fort Vancouver, on the Lower Columbia River, the mouth of which is defended by heavy batteries near Astoria.

The United States. are keenly sensible that fleets without well-defended coaling stations and fortified bases, accessible to the telegraph, and held in military occupation, are inefficient if not dangerous to trust to in modern warfare, and that they should not be relied upon alone to protect fixed points.

But America is peopled to a large extent by descendants of our own people. She

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