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The railway to be completed at least to Kalk Bay, and, if possible, to Simon's Town. If these precautions be taken, I see no necessity for building barracks on the heights above Simon's Town, or any defensive works to protect the rear of the batteries.
The distance from Simon's Town to the heights overlooking Chapman's Bay is not more than seven miles, or two hours' march.
It is difficult to conceive any contingency which would necessitate troops being placed quicker in position after the alarm was given; and I am of opinion, therefore, that the extra expense which barracks on the heights would entail (irrespective of buildings), and the discomfort to the troops which would be caused by such a step, may well be spared.
Half a battalion of British infantry, say 350 men, and about the same number of well- trained volunteers, kept together and properly handled, ought to be able to prevent at least twice their number from even ascending the heights overlooking Chapman's Bay, in view to an advance on Simon's Town.
The natural strength of the ground is very great, and every movement of the enemy could be plainly seen and anticipated.
Should the enemy by any chance have got possession of the heights, every inch of ground in their advance could be disputed, the advantage being altogether on the defending side.
The troops from Cape Town, moreover, would be able to assist the defence in a very material degree by advancing along the road from Visch Hock Bay to Chapman's Bay.
By this movement the enemy's retreat would be threatened, and, unless they left a strong force to protect the boats, might be compromised altogether.
In view to carry out this combination, it would be necessary to place some troops at Kalk Bay directly any chance of a hostile landing arose; and if two field-gun's, properly horsed, could form part of the detachment, it would add materially to its use- fulness.
There are a few places south of Chapman's Bay where it is said small parties might land, but no considerable force could do so without considerable risk.
Supposing timely notice to be given, any advance on Simon's Town from that part of the coast could be met as already described.
There are no safe landing places on any part of the east coast south of Simon's Bay. Small parties, however, could be landed in many places.
The permanent garrison of Simon's Town would be amply sufficient to meet any small attack from that quarter; but the chance of such an attack must be considered very unlikely.
A landing at Visch Hock Bay would be prevented by the detachment at Kalk Bay; but, as already stated, an advance on Simon's Town from that direction could hardly succeed.
The requirements for the defence of Simon's Town are then as follows: A garrison of about 700 or 800 men in Simon's Town (half a battalion Imperial). A detachment of Cape Town Volunteers at Kalk Bay of about 300 men and 2 guns. Signal stations to give early information. Roads to be improved and clearly marked out.
Railways to be continued to Kalk Bay, and if possible to Simon's Town.
Force not to be broken up into small detachments, but to be kept together and employed as a whole.
An advance upon Cape Town by a force landing at Hout's Bay is not very probable, owing to the distance and to the numerous positions for defence which present themselves along the line of advance. If torpedoes are laid down at the entrance to the bay, a battery erected at its north end, and signal stations established, a landing ought to be impossible. A detachment of volunteers should, however, be placed at Wynberg.
It is not probable that a landing would be attempted in places, such as Camp's Bay, Three Anchor Bay, or Table Bay, where at any moment the enemy's ships might be driven away from the coast by a change of wind, provided the land forces of Cape Town are known to be sufficiently numerous and efficient.
It would, I consider, be a waste of money, men, and material, to place batteries at every point where a landing is possible at all times.
My idea of the land defence of the peninsula, from one end to the other, is to improve the communications (roads and railway) so that troops may be moved rapidly to any threatened point, and by means of small signal-posts advantageously placed to obtain early information of where the enemy is apparently attempting to land.
Simon's Town should have about 1,000 men available for its defence; Cape Town about double that number.
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If this force be worked by one head, on the principle which I have endeavoured to any attack explain, I am of opinion that both towns may be looked upon as secure from that is likely to be made upon them.
Recapitulation of Requirements for Land and Sea Defences, Cape Town and Simon's Town.
Cape Town.
Five-gun battery on Kyk-in-de-Pot. Four-gun battery in Amsterdam Battery. Torpedo-boats in docks.
Imhoff, Knokke, and Craig's Tower, batteries to be looked upon as supplementary only, and only of use to prevent a landing in boats.
Garrison of 2,000 men.
Half a battalion of regulars.
One garrison battery, Royal Artillery.
Remainder to be volunteers.
Wynberg and Kalk Bay to have each about 300 men; field-guns to be at Kalk Bay. Hout's Bay to be defended by a battery and by torpedoes.
Simon's Town.
North battery of 3, and eventually of 4 guns. South battery of 2, and eventually of 4 guns.
An advanced battery of 2 guns, to be hereafter built, which would prevent a ship taking up a position to shell the town, where the south battery could not reach her, and would also protect a land approach.
Torpedo boats ready in dockyard. Garrison of 1,000 men.
Half a battalion of regulars.
One garrision battery Royal Artillery. Remainder volunteers.
Defence of Port Elizabeth.
This town can only be defended by direct fire from a battery or batteries placed on a
line with its outer edge of houses.
No cross fire can be obtained owing to the configuration of Algoa Bay. Should it therefore be determined to build a battery it ought to be armed with very powerful guns, which would be able to prevent a cruizer from approaching within easy shelling range.
One or two torpedo boats would seem to be essential to the defence of this They might be hauled upon slips, and housed near the beach ready for use.
place.
A volunteer force of about 1,500 men ought to suffice (if properly armed and drilled) for preventing a landing, or for opposing it effectually, should it have taken place at some distance from the town.
Port Alfred.
This barbour is not of sufficient importance at present to tempt the most enterprising enemy; and it would I think be unnecessary to spend money on its defence.
East London.
Neither East London or Panmure could pay a contribution which would be worth the trouble of collecting.
As however it is hoped that the harbour will eventually be an important one, it
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C.O. 885
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