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TLCO. 885

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The Imhoff Battery and Craig's Tower as at present armed could effectually assist in preventing a landing between the docks and Salt River should such be attempted, provided the necessary number of gunners would be forthcoming.

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According to Colonel Hassard's calculation, viz., 20 men per gun as a minimum, 200 gunners would be required for the batteries of " Kyk in de Pot" and Fort

Amsterdam.

Cape Town, July 7, 1878.

I agree with Commodore Sullivan and Colonel Hassard, R.E., that torpedoes could not be used with any certainty of effect in the defence of Table Bay. A torpedo-boat, how- ever, would be a very valuable adjunct; it might be kept in the docks housed ready for immediate use.

Defence of Simon's Bay from the Sea Side.

The north battery, now nearly completed for three guns, will, when armed, be able to prevent an encnry's cruizer from taking up a position on the north-cast side of the bay sufficiently near to shell the dockyard with good effect.

The south-east side is, however, at present but very inadequately protected by the temporary battery which has been erected in front of the cemetery.

It appears to me most essential that the south battery, which is immediately in front of the last named battery, should be at once prepared for the eventual reception of two 38-ton guns.

I would advise this work being commenced in preference to the completion of the north battery for four guns.

Three guns in the north battery, with two in the south battery, would at once provide a very effective cross-fire; and although these batteries will be only armed at first with the 6-ton guns which are now ready in the dockyard, they should be able to keep at a distance the description of cruizer which it is expected might possibly pay either Simon's Bay or Table Bay a visit.

An advanced battery, however, of at least two guns will be required on the road towards Miller's Point, to prevent an enemy's ship from taking up a position to shell Simon's Town, where she could not be touched by the south battery. This battery should also be able to command the land approach from Miller's Point,

As, however, these guns will only pierce about 4 inches of iron at about 2,000 yards, it would seem highly desirable that these batteries should be provided, as soon as possible. with a heavier armament.

Nor

Until these two batteries are completed and armed, I do not consider it would be advisable to commence any of the other batteries which it is proposed to erect. would I advocate their being built at all until it is absolutely certain that the heavier guns will be furnished for them, as well as for the north and south batteries.

The two last-named batteries having five (and eventually six) G-ton guns, ought to be sufficient to protect the dockyard from any unarmoured cruizer; but no multiplication of batteries so armed would protect it from attack by ships carrying but 4 inches of armour plating, as they would be able to lie off at a distance beyond the penetrating power of the gun, and shell the buildings with comparative impunity.

The temporary battery crected in front of the cemetery should be armed with 64-ton guns, in place of the 64-pounders now mounted. This battery should be retained until the guns in it are required for batteries better situated.

Torpedoes would not be of much use in defending Simon's Town; but a torpedo-boat should be at once provided.

The immediate number of gunners required will be about 100, or twenty for each of the five guns.

The Land Defence of Simon's Town and Cape Town.

The safety of the two towns from an attack on the land side by an invading fore depends so much upon mutual assistance being afforded by one to the other that I consider it would not be possible to propose any separate scheme of defence for the two.

It may possibly seem as if the assistance which Simon's Town could give to Cape Town is in no way commensurate with that which would be afforded were the problem

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reversed. The danger, however, to Cape Town which would accrue were Simon's Town to

fall into an enemy's hands, and be made a base of operations from which to attack it, is sufficient reason, I think, for not allowing so selfish a consideration any weight.

The several landing-places where, under certain conditions, it would be possible for an enemy to throw troops on shore, are contained in Appendix A.

Hout's Bay and Chapman's Bay appear to be the only two points on the west coast A landing where a landing in any force could be attended with any prospect of success.

at the former place would directly menace Cape Town.

Hout's Bay, however, from its sheltered postion, could be made the base of opera- tions for a force landing in boats at Chapman's Bay, in view to an attack on Simon's Town.

Simon's Town, therefore, may be said to be in greater danger from a force landing on the west coast than Cape Town.

I will, therefore, consider first the defensive arrangements required to insure the safety of the former place.

Although the country between Chapman's Bay and Simon's Bay is generally practicable for infantry, still the ground is so extremely broken and difficult, covered as it is with rocks and boulders, that an invading force would necessarily have to keep more or less to the roads or tracks.

Marking, as these do, therefore, the line of possible advance, it will really be suffi cient to consider what steps should be taken to bar the enemy's approach along those lines.

These roads or tracks are three in number.

They all start from a point near the Ostrich Farm in the Algemeene Valley; one goes straight to Visch Hock Bay, where it cuts into the main road between Cape Town and Simon's Town; the second runs in an almost straight line to Simon's Town; whilst the third makes a longish detour to the south, and eventually joins the second road on the heights overlooking Simon's Berg.

The first road is not likely to be made use of by an invading force, unless it were of much greater strength than we have any reason to expect.

It is the longest; and from Visch Hock Bay runs nearly the whole way through a defile formed by the mountains and the sea.

A force marching on Simon's Town by that route is liable to have its retreat com- pletely cut off, either by a Cape Town force from Kalk Bay, or by a force from Simon's Town moving by the direct road to Chapman's Bay.

It would, moreover, be easily checked and stopped in its advance by the whole Simon's Town force, which, after having defeated it, would have plenty of time to cross the moun- tains by the direct road, and cut off its retreat to the boats. All attack by that road ought, therefore, to be impossible.

It is almost certain, therefore, that a force landing in Chapman's Bay for the purpose of attacking Simon's Town would advance by the second or third alternative routes, perhaps by both.

On neither road is there any one position which, being fortified, would prevent the advance of an attacking force, unless it were occupied so strongly as to render it dangerous to pass by. It must then be the troops, and not any fortified post, to which we must look if Simon's Town is to be secured from attack.

The probability of Cape Town and Simon's Town being attacked simultaneously from the land side, presupposes the presence of an invading force so large as to be quite beyond all present means of defence.

I shall assume, therefore, that such an attack, though possible, is so remotely pro- bable as to render it unnecessary to be considered at this early stage of our preparations for defence; and I shall assume that, in defending Simon's Town, assistance may be expected from Cape Town, and vice versa.

As Hour's Bay is the only spot along the whole west coast where an enemy's ships could remain safely, whatever wind may blow, it is most essential that the entrance to this bay should be barred by torpedoes or batteries, or perhaps both.

The battery should be erected at the north end of the bay, so that, if necessary, might be protected from attack by boats, by troops sent out from Cape Town.

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Signal stations should be established at points overlooking Hout's Bay and Chapman's Bay, which should communicate with Simon's Town, and, if possible, with Cape Town

direct.

The roads leading to Hout's Bay and Chapman's Bay should be put in good repair and be clearly marked out, so that troops could be marched rapidly along them, by night as well as by day.

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