I'
INFORMATION 5. 1940 REGISTRY
CRISIS IN
Sunday Times
=1 MAY 1949
IN CHINA
By WALTER FLETCHER, M.P.
T is probably easier-and more dan- gerous to dogmatise about China in its present chaotic condition than on any other subject. One can be so right about one part of China and one set of conditions, yet draw such wrong con- clusions regarding the whole. Let us remember that there are 450 to 500 million people in China. The North has a different people, mentally and physically, from the South. There never has been effective Central Government in China for any long period. The province, with up to 50 million people, has been the true administrative and economic unit. There is little strong patriotic feeling; loyalty to the clan and to the family surpasses it. Foreigners are on the whole disliked in varying degrees. Mistrust of all Governments and dislike of officials is well-embedded in the public mind. When one hears of a strong popular backing for a new régime, it is nearly always an expression of a strong revulsion from an old one that has become too corrupt or too greedy.
Against this background of the Chinese character, which is intensely practical and unsentimental, we must try to find the answer to today's great question: will Communism succeed in indoctrinating and controlling China to the new Moscow pattern, or will her traditional ability to absorb and frustrate, by the active use of Inertia, any new movement result in the Sinification of Communism?
TRADE
RELATIONS
O far, though the Communist move-
North, there has been an urgent desire in Tientsin and Peking to retain contact and trading relations with the Western Powers. This is due to a keen realisa- tion that the success of Communism in China will depend largely upon the establishment of a stable currency. It is the second decline of the Kuomintang currencies to a point of no value that has finally destroyed popular backing for that régime.
Communism flourishes fully only where contact with the outside world is completely cut off. In China with its vast coastline and tradition of piracy and water communication I do not believe that an effective Iron Curtain can be put down. The true Communist fanatics at the top will in my opinion have real difficulty in getting a grip, like
Communists that of the
in Eastern Europe, upon a country of vast extent and 500 million inhabitants.
By clever and justified amelioration of the peasant's lot, Communism has
*
achieved great success in rural areas. and it is owing to this that the Com-. munists now control great cities and ports. International trade is vital to them if they are to continue to main- tain and improve the standard of living. Trade on a near-barter basis, but using foreign currency, has started on a moderate scale with Tientsin; shipments from Hong Kong of needed goods have continued, and goods like bristles, car- pets and other locally-produced material have come out. But it would be dan- gerous to draw from this the conclusion
PEIPING
TIENTSIN
HWAN
KAIFENG
HANKOW
CANTON
B
NANKING
FOOCHOW
HONGKON
E. CH
TSINGTAO
YELLOW SEA
SHANGHAI
FORMOSA
that the pattern will remain the same throughout China.
more
AS
the successful armies sweep South, as it seems they will, the influence of powerful local war lords and provincial Governments will become and more dominant. The Kwangsi bloc, always lightly attached to the Central Government, may well have quite different ideas and to a great The way in extent impose their will. which Shanghai may be occupied, and the compromises which will be worked out there, will be an interesting pointer to future events. There are, however, considerable dangers in the South, for
in Indo-China and South China power- ful pockets of Communism already exist.
Assuming that the Amethyst incident is out of the way, what must be the best policy in order to achieve the maximum resistance to Communism? The use force is to be ruled out. We do not possess it, the Americans are clearly in two minds about providing and using it, and the amount of force needed for a real success, positive and not negative, would weaken far too seriously the whole Western structure. The first necessity is to maintain our official and unofficial influence through Embassies, Consulates, banking and commercial houses, wherever they are established in China. This entails risks, as we know from the Yangtse incident. These risks must br taken and are being taken, as the Prime Minister acknowledged in his statement on Wednesday. The Chinese admire and understand tenacity of purpose, and in this respect the policy of His Majesty's Government up till now is clearly the correct one, although errors of judgment have undoubtedly been made.
HONG KONG
ECONDLY, the maintenance of Hong
SECONDLY, maintenance of China
remains vital, and in the clear interests of the Chinese themselves. The same applies in lesser degree to Shanghai, which still remains essentially an inter- national city, and may possibly continue SO in essence. behind Communist façade.
a
Thirdly, and of great importance, the many incidents that may occur must be.. looked at in their true perspective, and violent action, incapable of final success, patiently eschewed. In our past history in China, from the Boxer Rising down to the recent Canton incident, there has been a whole series of such events. The breaking-off of relations with China would serve no purpose. This is not a counsel of despair or of scuttle; on the contrary, it is the same policy as this country pursued at the beginning of the late war, when nothing but the will to survive carried us through.
One final and practical suggestion is the immediate enlargement, without a too cheeseparing counting of the cost, of the Hong Kong radio transmission. Used as it would be by the extremely
inhabitants, well-informed
it would hearten those who dislike and will
hostile become
to increasingly
the Communist régime. It can encourage resistance and eventually stimulate an even more active assertion of the national will.
passive
Me Howard Baths
Me Sidebotom MR W.-J.J. Wallace.
MR Whitley.