3
Communism as the paramount power in China, the impact of this
development among the Overseas Chinese communities, and the
necessity for H.M. G. to attempt to enter into reasonable
relations with the Chinese People's Republic. As an instance
●f the difficulty which this development oreates may be cited
the fact that almost the whole of the Overseas Chinese press in
South-East Asia is now toeing the Chinese Communist Government
line and refusing to accept material from British sources. It
may nevertheless be hoped that, by covert or indirect means, a
considerable volume of propaganda on the lines laid down in
paras 2
P
5 above may be directed at these communities and that,
if it is effective, the effect will be transmitted in part to
China itself.
8.
Towards the indigenous populations of South-East Asia
the task is theoretically easier: we must hammer into them the
essential opposition of Soviet imperialism to Asian nationalism
and seek to invoke the latter in the cause of resistance to
Communist encroachment. The Soviet Union has played into our
hands in this task to some extent by declaring its violent
hostility to the Governments of India, the Indonesian Republic, Burma and Siam. Nevertheless, the task is by no means easy, because the peoples involved are still largely unaware of the
Russian factor. Communism to most of them now means little
:'
more than Chinese Communism, while Russia to some of them
means a power which vaguely is understood to support national aspirations against European domination.
9.
The natural hostility of these peoples to Chinese expansionism will be a factor in stiffening their resistance
to Communism as such, but, in the light of our strong interest in good inter-racial relations in colonial territories, we cannot direct propaganda, even covertly, to stimulating this hostility.
10
An important part of this propaganda should where
possible consist of the communication of information to
Governments/