CO537-5132 — Page 36

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to the press no suggestion that such a tendency is, in fact,

or that we want it

developing/: on the contrary, our propaganda should harp on the

complete domination of the C.C.P. by the Kremlin and the

consequent subordination of Chinese interests to those of

Russia.

4.

J

H.M. G. 's policy of recognition of the Chinese People's

Republic imposes on us until further notice in this propaganda

two limitations: first, that all our emphasis should be on

the attempts of Russia to obtain the subservience of China,

and advantages at Chinese expense; we should not criticize

behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and Government in

acquiescing to the Kremlin's behaviour, and second, that the

greater part of our propaganda should be carried out as far as

possible at one remove from official British agencies of

information.

5.

The propaganda concerning Russian policy towards

China can be richly illustrated from the precedents of Soviet

behaviour towards her Eastern European satellites, the

economic advantages which she appears to be seeking and gain-

ing in Manchuria, her projection of traditional Russian

imperialist policy in the Far East as a whole, her tough

commercial methods, her technique of economie exploitation

under ideological cover, and the numbers and personal

behaviour of Russian technicians, advisers, intelligence

agents, commercial negotiators and officials who are

infiltrating into China.

6.

In South-East Asia, the propaganda task is really

divided into two parts (though Malaya is a special case):

propaganda towards the Overseas Chinese communities on the

one hand, and propaganda towards the indigenous Asian peoples

on the other.

The task of propaganda towards Overseas Chinese

communities is now severely complicated by the emergence of

Communism/