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HONG KONG
COS(49) 187
COMMAND AND GOVERNMENT
THE STAFF CONFERENCE had before them a letter from the Colonial Office concerning the possible clash between defence and trading interests in Hong Kong.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said he had already discussed this question with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had said that while the present Governor was excellent from the Colonial Office point of view - particularly because of the
he fully special character of Hong Kong as a trading post realised that difficulties were now likely to rise because of differences between the Governor and the military authorities. His difficulty was that there was no-one available who could replace the present Governor whose deep and intimate knowledge of Hong Kong was unrivalled. In any case it was most undesirable for any sudden change to be made in the Government of Hong Kong. Before leaving for Hong Kong, the Mini: ter of Defence wished to know the views of the Staff Conference on this difficult question.
MR. MALCOLM MACDONALD said that the real trouble was that in spite of the present Governor's many admirable qualities, he was frankly not the right man for the job in present circumstances
He tended when the Colony should be preparing for an emergency. to hold aloof from his advisers and lacked the quality of leader- ship which was so necessary for a population which tended to be
It was not at jumpy after its experiences in recent years.
present practicable to replace the Governor by a military Governor, for no Military Governor could possibly have the intimate knowledge of the Colony that was essential in Hong Kong. Unfortunately the Colonial Secretary who had been available to advise Admiral Harcourt during his most successful tenure as Military Governor had now left and could not return. there anyone who could take his place.
Nor was
In these circumstances, he had been inclined to suggest that, to avoid prejudicing the trading interests of the Colony by replacing the present Governor, a local Commander of all the
This officer should be of defence forces should be appointed. such standing that his views would carry real weight with the Governor. Alternatively, if it was not thought that this solution would work, he would suggest that the expedient which had been tried in Ceylon should be adopted for Hong Kong; namely
the that there should be both a civil and a Military Governor, latter having overriding powers when defence interests were involved. He regarded either of these solutions, neither of which were altogether satisfactory, as being merely a temporary arrangement designed to enable the Military Commander to take over as Governor, having acquired some working knowledge of the Colony, when a real emergency w developed.
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF, and GENERAL RITCHIE, were unanimous that the expedient of putting two Governors would not work in practice, and that Hong Kong in peacetime could not be compared with Ceylon in wartime. Such an arrangement would be bound to lead to a clash of personalities and would, in practice, intensify the clash between defence and trading interests.
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