CO537-5001 — Page 95

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Steps must be taken at once to infuse a new spirit into Hong Kong. It would be no use waiting until an actual attack developed for by that time the harm to the morale of the Colony would already have been done.

LORD TEDDER said that he was not altogether convinced that to appoint a Military Governor at this stage would mean serious interference with trade. On the contrary, he thought that leadership was necessary, at this stage, only for defence and internal security, but also for economic and commercial affairs. He therefore thought that a personality like Admiral Harcourt, who would by no means be ignorant of the problems of Hong Kong, would be of considerable value to the Colony if he were now appointed as Governor.

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SIR WILLIAM SLIM said that the prosent approach to the problem was not the right one. It was not a question of whether the trading interests or the defence interests were more important; the really important point was the part that Hong Kong would play in the cold war. Both trade and defence in Hong Kong were involved in this. He fully agreed with Lord Tedder about the importance of leadership. The expedient of putting two Governors in Hong Kong would merely lead to confused leadership. On the other hand. if it were decided to put a Military Commander in Hong Kong with the prosent Governor, he thought it would be essential. that the Military Commander should be given overriding powers when defence interests were affected and to decide what measures affected defence interests.

LORD FRASER said that to give the Military Commander overriding powers would create difficulties. He thought that a senior officer such as General Festing, if appointed to command the services in Hong Kong, would have sufficient influence on the Governor so that any definite clash would be avoided. He did not think that Admiral Harcourt would be appointed because, having been Governor, he could hardly serve in Hong Kong in a subordinate position. Furthermore, his position would be difficult vis-a-vis the Naval Commander-in-Chief who had to spend a good deal of his time at Hong Kong and who would have to retain command of the naval forces on the Far East Station other than those stationed permanently at Hong Kong for local defence purposes.

MR. SCARLETT said that the Foreign Office view was that a physical threat to Hong Kong was less likely than pressure in other forms. The Chinese Communists, when once they were firmly in the saddle, would undoutedly try to get rid of us and would probably do it by attempting to mobilise all the anti-Colonial feeling in Asia against us. The Foreign Office thought that this would be less easy for them if we maintained a civil Government in Hong Kong than if we appointed a Military Governor who would be held to be a symbol of Imperialism.

After considerable discussion, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE said that it was difficult to resist the views of the Chiefs of Staff that two Governors in Hong Kong would not be practicable, A further argument against this expedient was that the Ceylon arrangement, when prolonged into the peace, had not been successful as far as commercial interests were concerned.

An even stronger argument against the appointment of a Military Governor at this stage was that we were at present trying to enlist the moral support of the Commonwealth and the United States for our stand at Hong Kong and to convince them that what we were doing was not Colonialism or Imperialism but resistance to aggression in accordance with the spirit of the

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