10 October 1949.
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Annex I to JIC (FE) (49) 41 (Final)
Air Threat.
35.
The Chinese Communists have at present no air force in the accepted sense of an entity organised to Wastern standards with operational, training and maintenance elements under co-ordinated central control. They are thought to possess a small number of bombers and fighter-bombers captured from or handed over by the C.N.a.F. and, in addition, a heterogenous collection of obsolete Japanese and Russian aircraft.
36.
It is possible that the Chinese Communists will benefit to some extent from future defections or captures of C.N.A.F. aircraft and personnel but it is thought unlikely that their gains from these sources will reach significant proportions or that any major part of the C.N..F. will be involved. We consider that material assistance will not be provided by the U.S.S.R. and that any substantial increase in the size of their air arm is therefore improbable.
37.
The Communists will not therefore be in a position to undertake sustained air operations. All that seems possible is for them to initiate a series of sporadic air attacks. The scale and effectiveness of such attacks is difficult to assess, though it is thought unlikely that more than a few aircraft could be operated with any real co-ordination or precision.
38.
If a direct land assault is launched against Hong Kong, it is possible that the Communists will employ such operational aircraft as they can muster from their meagre resources. These aircraft could be directed against Kai Tak in an attempt to prohibit our use of that airfield and destroy aircraft on the ground or any aircraft carrier near Hong Kong; or against Hong Kong and Kowloon, or against our land forces in the New Territories.
39.
Since the Communists are unlikely to be able to mount more than sporadic attacks, results they achieve against Kai Tak or our land defences should not be 'serious. They may possibly refrain from direct air attack on Hong Kong and Kowloon in order not to antagonise the Chinese population. Nevertheless should such attacks materialise, the moral effect of a few bombs on the unstable populations could be out of all proportion to the effort expended or the material damage inflicted.· If as is possible the ground had been previously prepared by subversive elements, the resulting internal disorders might well increase the require- ment of troops for internal security duties.
Maritime Threat.
40.
Numbers of ships were acquired by the Communists from thề Nationalist navy during the fighting on the Yangtse, and defections may well occur in the future. Should they acquire control of all operational Nationalist warships, in addition to their present force, the Chinese Communists would be able to muster one destroyer, ten destroyer escorts, twenty-four minor seagoing vessels and a number of armed small craft, together with a dozen landing ships and a number of miscellaneous craft.
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