CO537-5000 — Page 49

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10 October 1949

4

Annex I to JIC (FE) (49)41(Final)

The above numbers appear somewhat formidable, but even though the Communists may be able to infuse some of the spirit and discipline of their armies into their new navy, their inexperience and lack of technical ability will drastically reduce the value of their ships. If they met no air or sea-going opposition they might be of some value in support of the army, but a small force would be sufficient to neutralise them.

42.

From the time at which the Communists decide to force the issue, attempts must be expected at both internal and external sabotage of ships in Hong Kong ; this is likely to be aimed as much at merchant shipping as at warships.

43.

From this period onwards channels adjacent to Communist- held territory will be liable to minelaying. This may well be amateur in the extreme, but, as has already been shown in the Hanoi area and Pearl River, such methods can be effective against small ships.

44.

In addition to the larger craft described above, the Communists have acquired a small number of landing craft. These could be used to carry raiding or invading troops, and could be supplemented by a large number of junks, sampans and the like, which are available, and in the use of which the Communists have already shown themselves adept.

45.

There is no submarine threat unless assistance is obtained from Russia. It is not in line with present Soviet policy to make such assistance available at this stage.

THREATS IN THE EVENT OF WAR BETWEEN THE WESTERN POWERS, AND

COMBINATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.

Land Threats

46.

In the event of war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly ba allied to the latter country from the outset, and would in general take directions from the Soviet High Command. Expulsion of the British from Hong Kong would be one of the subsidiary aims of the Soviet Union and this task would be allotted to the Chinese Communists. Since the political deterrents described in paragraph 13 above would no longer apply an immediate attack on the Colony must be considered inevitable. The method of attack and the forces employed would be similar to those already described.

47.

Russian advice and technical and material assistance would be made available. The Soviet Union is unlikely to send any land forces, other than specialised detachments and some armour, south of the Yangtse Valley.

Internal Threat

48.

The entry of the Soviet Union into a war against the Allies would strongly influence the Chinese sections of the Hong Kong Defence and Police Forces and civil defence. services and, unless there are convincing signs of our ability to hold the Colony, large-scale desertions must be expected.

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