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10 October 1949
Annex I to JIC(FE)(49)41(Final)
7
29.
The majority of the arms and equipment would be likely to be of U.S. and Japanese origin without any great quantity of mechanical transport. It is possible that up to 100 ex-U.S. light tanks and ex-Japanese tankettes, together with up to 50 ex-U.S. amphibious vehicles, could be used in support of the attacking force.
30.
The fighting value of the Chinese Communist Army is difficult to assess in as much as it has, up to the present, met with only negligible resistance and has never been confronted by a deter ined defence or by concentrated air or artillery attack. It is known, however, that a relatively high standard of discipline has been attained in the reorganised formations, and that some Russian assistance has been received in various forms of training. The offensive would be likely to take the form of a frontal attack, with heavy though unco-ordinated artillery support, across the border. Tactics are likely to be a combination of Russian and Japanese methods, with continuous waves of troops attacking frontally and infiltration on, and around, the flanks by land and sea. Such infiltration might precede a frontal attack.
31.
It is unlikely that Russian advisory, technical or material assistance would be given, although it is to be expected that a number of Japanese will be found in the more technical appointments.
32.
Little is known regarding the supply of ammuniti n and the ability of the Chinese Communist Army to maintain its equipment, although there have been indications that the supply of artillery ammunition and technical stores is causing serious difficulties. that the industrial capacity of Menchuria is already, with Russian
It is possible assistance, capable of manufacturing at least some types of ammunition and spares.
33.
The Chinese Communist Army is relying on mule transport and porterage for the movement of the bulk of its field equipment. Motor transport is used mainly to supplement rail transport on the lines of communication.
34.
The Chinese Communist Army artillery consists of 75mm, 105,, and 155mm pieces. The effectiveness in operations is limited by the very small supply of ammunition, a low standard of fire control and a shortage of trained gunners. It should therefore be considered as equivalent in efficiency to not more than half that number of British guns. The armoured element of light tanks and tankettes is unlikely to contribute effectively to any major battle.
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