CO537-5000 — Page 46

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10 October 1949

6

Annex I to JIC(FE) (49)41(Final)

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Air Threat

23.

The only tyre of air action possible during this period is reconnaissance undertaken at infrequent intervals by visual, and probably also photographic means. Chinese Communist air services would probably be used in the normal course of traffic to achieve these needs, but the use of military aircraft is possible.

Maritime Threat

24.

During this period no purely maritime threat to the harbours of Hong Kong is to be expected. The carriage of Communists in and out of the Colony by junks and other shipping must be expected to continue: THREATS DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING AN OPEN DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO SECURE THE RETURN OF THE COLONY WITH OR WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE

General

25.

The first effort would be still further to intensify the methods previously applied in conjunction with the military threat on the border together with an economic embargo.

26.

The object of this would be to make conditions in the Colony so difficult and its economic value so negligible that His Majesty's Government would find its continued retention purely as a fortress too heavy a liability. Even if these methods fail the Chinese Communists would hope that the way would be made easier for a military offensive, and this might form the next step. Though for the present the deterrents referred to in paragraph 13 above would still apply.

27.

The Chinese Communists would be unlikely to attempt an invasion until they had concentrated a force of about 80,000, supported by the maximum artillery which they could deploy. This force could be increased at any time but its use would be subject to the limitations imposed by the restrictive nature of the terrain. Reserve units of the Chinese Communist Army or guerillas might well be used to carry out diversionary raids by sea.

28.

The Chinese Communist Army may have a force of this strength, together with up to 360 guns of mixed calibre, between Canton and the borders of the new Territories by the end of November, though this date could be retarded if considerable Nationalist opposition were enc untered before the capture of Canton. However, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communist Army would wish to stage an all-out attack against the Colony until re-grouping had been carried out to include some of the more experienced formations, including artillery, of General Lin Piao's field army at present in the Hengyang area * Before this re-grouping can be undertaken the Chinese Communist Army will probably have to eliminate the threat from the Nationalist armies of General Pai Chung- Hsi in the Hengyang area and overcome the logistic difficulties implicit in the southward move. We consider, therefore, that such a re-organised force is unlikely to be ready before January 1950, from which date the threat of an all-out attack will exist.

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Footnote to Para 28 of Annex I.

A communist decision to allow General Lin Piao's forces to continue their advance into Kwengsi province on the completion of the operation on which they are now engaged would provide an important indication that a military offensive against Hong Kong was not intended in the immediate future.

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