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Commissioner of Police and G.O.C. and that they were going to. make an intensified effort with all available Army, R.A.F. and Police resources for the next two months in support of the publication of surrender terms. The vital importance of the next two months is being explained to all commanding officers and the troops urged to make a special effort. General Harding (and of course Sir H. Gurney) feel that it would be very unwise to count on a large scale response to the surrender terms.
6. General Harding is not at all happy about the organisation for the forward planning and general direction of anti-bandit operations, nor about the arrangements for co-ordinating political, administrative and psychological measures with the activities of the Army and Police. These questions were dis- cussed at a B.D.C.C. meeting on the 30th August and the High Commissioner is being asked to prepare for consideration by the B.D.C.C. on the 11th October a detailed intelligence review with an operational appreciation and outlined plan of campaign for the period November onwards. General Harding thinks this is most important not only for the proper conduct of the Malayan campaign but in order to enable the B.D.C.C. to assess the rival claims of Malaya and Hong Kong which he feels are bound to arise soon. General Harding hopes that as a result there will be 11 a tidier and more effective machinery" as opposed to a series of ad hoc operations. However, he is very worried about our total ignorance of the future policy and plans of the bandit controlling organisation; he says that our tactical information is all too scanty and stale but our strategic information is nil.
7. It looks as if the question of Army and Police cooperation and direction of operations may be brought into the arena at these discussions, since one inference to be drawn from the above is that General Harging is not entirely satisfied with Colonel Gray's direction operations. The present position is that for the first few months of the emergency the Police were in such bad shape that the Military took virtual control of the situation; after Colonel Gray's arrival Army-Police relations were put on a different and more satisfactory footing and it will be recalled that the High Commissioner is always at pains to emphasise that the present operations are under Police control and that the Military are at all times acting in support of the Police and under their general direction.
8. I think If General Harding thinks that the bandits conduct a "strategic campaign", with forward planning and all, he tends to overassess the extent to which the bandits operate on conventional military lines. Our evidence to date, is that the central organisation, such as it is, hage the greatest difficulty in executing any strategic plan because of the immense difficulty of communications and the inevitable result that circumstances have frequently completely altered before the plan can be put into effect. A great measure of latitude is and obviously must be allowed to the local bandit leaders. However, the little we know of the bandit strategy and their future intentions is sufficiently disturbing and makes it clear that the bandits, even if their main resistance is broken, can be a lingering menace for a considerable time to come and I am sure that General Harding's intervention will be a useful stimulus to the authorities on the spot. My own view is,more important than any question of military strategy in Malaya, is the question of general Communist strategy in the whole area; I am coming Around increasingly to the view that the real danger in Malaya is not so much the M.C.P. as the C.C.P.; the M.C.P. is now largely discredited with the Chinese community, but the C.C.P. is already trying to show that it is the true guardian of the interests of all overseas Chinese and is endeavouring to acquire a greater influence in Malaya and Singapore through the medium of suitable "fellow travellers". We are in touch with the J.I.C. on this subject with a view to an appreciation being prepared of relationships between the M.C.P. and the C.C.P. and future C.C.P. policy vis-a-vis Malaya.
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