CO537-5000 — Page 6

on the bandit Campaign." (May 24th.)

We

may

note, however, that in the drags

of (HS 110-111), tel. to Hong Kong repeated

blomm. Geul.,

the second

sentence of

the possibility of

para. 2 covering kinforcement from Malaya

lear it should

was deleted

worry Singapore. Joan A. Sowed.

1.9.63

t

I attended a meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff yesterday to discuss (161). I said that, since it was not clear from the text of this telegram that the High Commissioner had been consulted, we had telegraphed for his urgent observations which had not yet been received. I therefore reserved the Colonial Office view and made it clear that in any case the Secretary of State would have to be consulted.

>

2. I said that our first reaction was that, while the with- drawal of troops from Malaya would undoubtedly lessen the tempo of anti-bandit operations and would in particular make it more difficult to attack the hard core formations which had retired into the jungle, the most serious aspect was political. The High Commissioner's efforts to induce the Chinese community to come down on the side of positive action against the bandits had not met with a full measure of success; events in China were making the Chinese community sit on the fence more desper- ately than ever. The withdrawal of British troops could only reinforce the Chinese in their passive attitude.

3. After a brief discussion the Vice Chiefs of Staff decided to recommend that the B.D.C.C.'s proposals in (161) should be approved in principle but that no actual movement of troops to Hong Kong should take place without further approval from London. A draft telegram would be prepared and submitted to the Minister of Defence and Colonial Secretary. I had a talk with the D.M.0., who was also at the meeting, on the practical implications of the proposals in paragraph 4 of (161). His view was that the withdrawal from active operations of the Infantry Batallion mentioned in (4a) would be necessary if the internal situation in Hong Kong appeared threatening, even in advance of the decision to send the troops. The move in (4b) wad of the remainder of the Brigade Group would, on the other hand, not involve their withdrawal from active operations until the decision that they must go had in fact been taken.

40

Major General Redman showed me a copy of a personal telegram from General Harding to the C.I.G.S. of which I report the gist below. This information should not be quoted and I have had to return the copy of the telegram to General Redman. Mr. Paskin has, however, seen.

5.

General Harding said that he had discussed all aspects of the anti-bandit campaign with the High Commissioner,

/Commissioner of