II
2
(c)
(a)
(e)
(1)
The linking-up of fighting with Agrarian Reform has ad- vanced one step further.
The modification of relations between classes and the united front.
Imminent liberation of the whole country.
Chiang has reached such a decayed stage that it is be- yond salvation. He can only desperately turn to America for aid and betray further and bigger national interests in order to gain a breathing space.
Situation in South China.
3.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The SUNG'S Kingdom and its intrigues.
LAU'S impending southward drive and the return of the "Liang Kwong"Column. (20,000/30,000 men have reached Cen- trai China).
Further popular uprisings. (The south- ward movement of our main forces will create major changes.)
Our new missions:
to receive the river-crossing, to deal a blow to the so-called Democrats and
(c) To sink our roots and open flowers
quickly.
(Translator's Note
To meet LAU'S southward drive SUNG has pre- pared 15 Peace Preservation
Corps Regiments and 3 divisions of regulars total strength about 50,000 men half of thesein Kwangsi. Chiang's focal point is in the "Liang Kwangs"; so is ours. Dur- ing the past year our strength in Kwangtung has in- creased tenfold. Former strength about 3/4,000; at present inthe region of 3/40100 About 10,000 in Kwangsi; now bein adjusted.
LAU is BAU PAK SHING, better known as the "One-eyed
Dragon"
-
a well-known
Communist General. "Liang Kwangs" is a general name for Kwangtung and Kwangsi.)
Party's Policy Is Dependant on the Peasants for Thorough Per- Becution of War.
1. Why should we rely on the peasants?
(1)
Peasants form the majority of population; Chinese work- ing classes should unite with the former.
(2)
They are oppressed the most by Feudalism.
(3)
They are the reserve of Communist Army.
2.
Why should we persecute the war to the end?
(1)
(2)
Lessons learned in the past.
Half-hearted efforts will mullify all the labour pre- viously spent.