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INTERNAL SECURITY AND ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE.
28. Normal calls for aid to the Civil Power, to deal with Internal
trouble, are likely to be received by the Services from time to time, without any physical threat from outside. On these occasions Regular Forces up to the maximum can readily be made available. Under the circumstances envisaged in this appreciation the situation will be quite different. Until the extent of the external threat is known, Commander KOWLOON Infantry Brigade should be given the maximum available resources to meet it and troops should not be held back to deal with anticipated or actual internal trouble.
29.
Deductions.
(a) There must be two defence plans, one to deal with solely Internal strife and the other with Internal and External combined.
(b) The resources under command of and available to support
the Commissioner of Police, must be adequate to deal with the Internal trouble and he should only envisage calling for military assistance from Regular forces as a last resort. The ease or difficulty of his task will in all probability be governed largely by the extent of initial success attained by an aggressor.
(c) When a threat of attack from outside is apparent Comm-
ander KOWLOON Infantry Brigade should be freed of all responsibility for Internal Security.
MAINTENANCE.
30.
(a) The defence of the Colony is essentially a matter for the three Services. Land Forces are dependent on the sea forces for maintenance, reinforcement, etc., and sea forces are in turn dependent to a large extent, on air forces for protection against air attack.
(b) So long as the enemy's L. of C. are threatened in the
FANLING quadrilateral and rendered useless by demolitions, the enemy force which might by-pass the FANI ING quadrilateral can be looked upon more as a guerilla force, unless and until it can be maintained by fifth columnists or can seize supplies and am nition.
(c) The danger of our installations, etc., being overrun are
greater on the mainland than on the Island. On the other hand, the supply problem is far less difficult if our installations are on the mainland.
(d) Maintenance forward of the FANL ING cuadrilateral would
have to be carried out largely by AT, working parties or air drops.
31. Deductions.
(a) It would appear desirable to retain the battalion in the
SAN TAI area even if it be cut off, and put our efforts into maintaining it there.
(b) Supply sources in the Colony must be prevented from
falling into enemy hands.
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/(c)
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