CO537-4998 — Page 156

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(c) Fifth Columnists would have to be dealt with by the

forces responsible for I.S. measures in HONG KONG and KO LOON.

(a) Adequate arrangements must be made for defending

installations on the mainland. Stores, etc., not required for fighting the battle for the NEW TERRITORIES and KOWLOON should be held on the II AND. Adequate plans for guarding the L. of C. must also be made.

(e) A Brigade maintenance area should be established in the forward area. Demolitions forward of the LONG RIDGE CHEVIOTS NORTH DC NS Defence Line could be carried out on a wide scale. These would hamper the enemy and not effect our maintenance.

SUMMARY OF MAIN DEDUCTIONS

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Some fighter support and A.A. defences will be required if the Colony is to be defended successfully against aggression by a Chinese invader.

Arrangements for guarding Civil and military VPs and keeping the essential Services working must be made without relying on the Regular Forces for assistance.

All available gun support both from the Navy and Royal Artillery must be used to full advantage. The Field Regiment should not be tied down on infantry static duties.

35. Until the Infantry Battalion of the HONG KONG Regiment

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(H.K.V.D.C.) is fully trained it could form a useful reserve for supporting the Co-missioner of Police in carrying out his Internal Security responsibilities.

Any military reserve available should be held in a location from whence it can either: -

(i) Reinforce the Frontier Battle, or

(ii) Reinforce the Forces maintaining law and order in

HONG KONG and KO LOON.

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The reserve should be under command the G.0.C. NOT Commander KOWLOON Infantry Brigade.

Commander KOWLOON Brigade must be left free to fight the land battle and have no responsibility for the Internal Security situation in HONG KONG and KOWLOON.

The principle should be accepted now, that normally the Commissioner of Police will remain in general control of HONG KONG and KOWLOON, the military supporting and/or taking over from the Polico specified areas as and when required.

Although the exact time, date, and place of any attack may be difficult to ascertain, our intelligence resources should be able to say that one is iminent. For this reason preliminary moves to moot, the throat must be made on the receipt or the warning by intelligence we must be pre- pared for false alarms. This early action is all the more important since initial success or otherwise of the enemy will have an over iding effect on the attitude of local inhabitants, both European and Chinese.

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