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9400/28. Horny 202
28 January 1949
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Extrees from BDCC (FT) 16th lits.
SITUATION IN HONG KONG original
5
The Meeting had before it telegrams* from the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the situation in Hong Kong.
Sir Alexander GRANTHA revicwed the situation as he saw it as follows:-
Refugees. Large districts near the Hong kong border were already In the hands of Communists or guerillas, so a change to Communist government in South China should be peacefully effected in the border areas, and not cause a large influx of the local peasantry into Hong Kong. Any fighting in wangtang was likely to be to the north of Canton, and any large rufugce movement would, in the first instance, be into that city. Road communications between Canton and Hong Kong were bad and the railway could be controlled, so a largo efflux of refugees from Canton to Hong Kong was unlikely.
Guerillas. A good understanding cxisted between the Hong Kong frontier police and the guerillas and Communists across the border, and unless trouble was precipitated by the strict closing of the frontier or by blood being shed there was no immediate likelihood of large scale trouble.
Strikers. The possibility of ordinary industrial strikes always existed, and the Communists in Hong Kong might take advantage of one to stir up trouble. But in general the Communists in China were anxious to preserve the trade of the country, and had behaved well to foreign interests in places under their control. There was however, the possibility that a general strike would follow any untoward incident on the frontier.
Sir Alexander GRANTHA also said that a system of regist- ration would be introduced, based on the rationing system, which already covered half the population. This could be done quite naturally, and then other applicants could be invited to register under certain conditions. Only those registered would, in an emergency, have certain specified rights.
Sir Neil RITCHIE said his concern was with what troops would be required, and when. He had estimated that the cxisting. garrison was sufficicnt unless an external threat arose, and that then an additional brigade group would be sufficient. He might be able to spare troops from Malaya starting in mid-1949, and be able to send the complete Guards Brigade to Hong Kong by the end of the year.
But unless the situation in Malaya improved troops could not be spared, and any reinforcements for Hong Kong would have to come from outside the theatre.
Sir Hugh LLOYD thought that a large influx of refugees was always possible, and the danger could not be ignored.
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* COSS AS 665 and 666 and Despatch No.48 dated
15 January 1949.