12.
The Communists have at present no operational air experience and the morale of those Nationalist aircrews who lave defected is low and they are most unlikely to be prepared to press home any attack in the face of even the slightest Opposition. In view of this, any air threat to the Colony is likely to be short lived, of poor operational standard and lacking in determination.
13. We do not believe that there is likely to be any further appreciable defection from the Nationalist Air Force but should a peace be arranged, the transfer of the Nationalist Air Forces at present in Formosa would undoubtedly be one of the conditions imposed by the Communists. This might bring some further 450 modern aircraft under Communist control.
Unless, however, the Communists are reinforced by Russian personnel, which we consider to be most unlikely at present, the standard of operational technique would remain poor and determination to press home the attack would be lacking.
Naval Threat
14. At the time of the crossing of the Yangtze, the Nationalist Navy consisted of the following ships:-
6 Destroyers
Destroyer Escorts
12 Escort Vessels
11 Minesweepers
3 Patrol Boats
12 Submarine Chasers
11 L.S.T.
9 L.S.M.
8 L.C.I.
8 L.C.T
1 L.C.R.
It is known that one ex-Japanese destroyer has since surrendered to the Communists who also claim six further vessels. Some of the above will, however, have been sunk or damaged in the recent fighting. A further four destroyer escorts manned by Chinese are on passage from the United States to China but it is not known what action they are likely to take.
15. For any attack on Hong Kong it is considered that a proportion of the above must be expected to take part, having either surrendered or been captured, but they will be incapable of operating together efficiently or of organising any amphibious operation.
-3m