CO537-4998 — Page 62

tempted by nationalistic ambitions, or alternatively by the possibility of an early conquest, to risk hostilities against the United Kingdom, it seems unlikely that they will undertake an attack upon Hong Kong for some time. Evidence of the British intention to resist any attack on Hong Kong would considerably reduce the likelihood of the Communists deciding to attack the Colony.

6. Since, however, the possibility of an early attack on Hong Kong cannot be ruled out entirely, we have estimated below its possible scale and nature.

POSSIBLE SCALE AND NATURE OF ATTACK

Internal Threat

7.

With the establishment of a Communist regime on the borders of the Colony, the Hong Kong Trade Unions are likely to take orders from the Central Communist Government; the police force may become unreliable; und the Chinese element in the Volunteer Forces may be disaffected. Should, therefore, the Communists decide to attack Hong Kong, labour unrest, strikes, demonstrations and mutiny are to be expected,

8.

As a result of the Communist advance to the South the garrison of the Colony would have to contend with the internal security problem of an attempted large scale influx of refugees.

Land Threat

9. Although the Communists will have available a land force of the size described in paragraph 4 above, they would not be able to deploy all these forces against Hong Kong. It is considered that not more than the equivalent of 2-3 divisions could be used against the landward defences. In addition, there would undoubtedly be an attempt to land forces in various parts of the Colony by sea. Large numbers of sampans will be available in the Canton River and Mirs Bay and may well be employed in trying to land troops on the Island of Hong Kong and behind the defence line in the New Territories. Recent evidence shows that the Communist Army have managed successfully to collect and man large numbers of local craft for river crossings.

10. We consider that the Communist Armies, for a native force, are well disciplined and organised. Their leaders have been able to make and execute relatively sound and complex plans. Their armament includes automatic weapons and artillery up to 150 mm. Their tanks are few, old and small. They have virtually no motor transport.

Air Threat

11.

Although it has been known for some time that the Communists have been training on old Japanese aircraft, up to the present they have not made any use of aircraft in operations. It is known that they have obtained some aircraft by defection from the Nationalist Forces and 21 aircraft comprising

3 Liberators, 5 Mustangs, 2 Mitchels and 11 Dakotas have been identified. This count is however incomplete and there may be other aircraft not at present identified. There will also undoubtedly be many other aircraft left behind by the Nationalists in an unserviceable condition. Some of these might be made serviceable providing sufficient maintenance personnel could be made available from captured Nationalist troops or civil air companies.

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